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Free Speech and Public Order Exceptions: A Case for 
the U.S. Standard 
Asma T. Uddin∗ 
“An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that 
private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply 
circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment 
when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the 
house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same 
mob in the form of a placard.” 
– John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859) 
“Any person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call 
themselves ‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name), who directly or 
indirectly, poses himself as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith 
as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to 
accept his faith, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible 
representations, or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious 
feelings of Muslims shall be punished with imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may extend to three years and shall 
also be liable to fine.” 
– Pakistani Penal Code 298-C 
INTRODUCTION 
Every society must deal with speech that could potentially lead to 
violence. Governments in several Muslim-majority countries have 
struggled to develop proper constitutional protections for free 
speech and religious freedom. The challenge has been especially clear 
in countries like Pakistan, where religious violence is widespread. Yet, 
while the unrest has increased demands for speech restrictions, the 
key to stability is liberty. 
This Paper will focus on Pakistan’s speech restrictions under its 
blasphemy laws—the source of some of the most egregious religious 
freedom violations in the world. Pakistan’s blasphemy laws often lead 
 
∗ Asma T. Uddin is Counsel at The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Director of Strategy for 
the Center for Islam and Religious Freedom, and the founding editor-in-chief 
of altmuslimah.com. 
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to riots, community violence, and infringement of basic human 
rights. For example, on May 7, 2014, human rights lawyer Rashid 
Rehman was murdered for defending Junaid Hafeez, a poet and 
Fulbright scholar, who was accused by his students of insulting the 
Prophet Muhammad on Facebook.1 The accusations were baseless, 
but as with most cases of blasphemy charges in Pakistan no real 
evidence was needed. Hafeez was charged by the police and was 
defenseless without a lawyer when Rehman agreed to represent 
Hafeez in court.2 The government did nothing to protect Rehman, 
who received death threats even as he stood in front of the judge in 
the courtroom.3  
The blasphemy laws persecute not only Pakistan’s Muslims, but 
also its religious minorities. In June 2009, a Pakistani Christian 
woman, Aasia Bibi, offered water to fellow farm workers.4  
They refused to accept on the grounds that she was a Christian 
and, therefore, they believed the water must be contaminated. 
An exchange of words occurred, with each side defending their 
religion. Allegedly, Aasia insulted the Prophet Muhammad by 
saying, “The Quran is fake and your prophet remained in bed for 
one month before his death because he had worms in his ears 
and mouth. He married Khadija just for money and, after looting 
her, kicked her out of the house.” A few days later, a mob set 
upon Aasia, and the police rescued her from certain death. 
However, the police later charged her with committing 
blasphemy and held her in isolation for 17 months while she 
awaited trial.5 
Aasia Bibi was found guilty of blasphemy and the local court 
ruled that there were “no mitigating circumstances,” sentencing her 
 
 1. Andrew Buncombe & Umair Aziz, Pakistani Lawyer Rashid Rehman Murdered 
After Taking on Blasphemy Case, THE INDEPENDENT (May 8, 2014), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/ incoming/pakistani-lawyer-rashid-rehman-murdered-after-
taking-on-blasphemy-case-9341021.html. 
 2. Ali Sethi, Pakistan’s Tyranny of Blasphemy, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2014), 
http://nyti.ms/1nhPZIG. 
 3. Waqar Gillani, Pakistani Activist Shot Dead; Aided Blasphemy Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 7, 2014, at A8, available at http://nyti.ms/1kN6smp. 
 4. Asma T. Uddin, Blasphemy Laws in Muslim-Majority Countries, REV. FAITH & INT’L 
AFF. Summer 2011, at 47, 47. 
 5. Id. (citations omitted). 
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to death by hanging.6 This unfortunate event reveals the 
contradiction of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws, which are premised on 
protecting public order, but once again appeased rather than 
controlled violent extremists, giving them license to bully a religious 
minority while the police and justice system looked the other way. 
This Paper will explain why and how policy makers can use the 
U.S. free speech standard to guide the formulation of free speech 
standards in other countries such as Pakistan. Part I will explain the 
current state of religious freedom in Pakistan and other similar 
countries, in particular as it relates to the religious speech and alleged 
blasphemy. Part II will analyze the history of free speech in Pakistan, 
comparing and contrasting the era before and after General Zia-ul-
Haq’s regime. It will also look at how Pakistani law treats religious 
speech or blasphemy differently than other types of speech, with a 
focus on Pakistani courts’ use of U.S. case law. Lastly, it will discuss 
Pakistan’s role internationally with speech-related resolutions at the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). 
Part III will use the Pakistani courts’ reliance on U.S. case law as 
a launch pad for a more detailed comparison between Pakistan’s and 
the United States’ use of public order arguments in speech cases. 
Part of the exploration of the guiding value of U.S. law is how and 
why U.S. free speech jurisprudence arrived at its current state—Part 
IV will explore precisely that issue. Finally, in Part V, this Paper will 
present policy reasons for what the U.S. model can offer as guidance 
to countries that are in the process of developing their free speech 
standard. The Paper will conclude with concrete recommendations 
for policymakers. 
I. BACKGROUND: PAKISTAN AND OTHER MUSLIM COUNTRIES’ 
APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS SPEECH 
A. Pakistan’s Challenges with Religious Speech 
 
Pakistan is the focus of this Paper for two reasons. First, it 
consistently performs very poorly at protecting religious speech and 
is thus emblematic of bad free speech law and the consequences of 
such laws as explained above. Second, it provides a good example of 
domestic courts that have recently sought U.S. guidance by 
 
 6. Id. 
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referencing U.S. case law, especially concerning public order. These 
two factors together make Pakistan a good case study in how U.S. 
law can be used to guide the development for broader protections of 
free speech law. 
Pakistan’s greatest limitations on religious speech were instituted 
by an expanded set of blasphemy laws.7 These laws originate in the 
Indian Penal Code of 1860, and were enacted by the British colonial 
government.8 The purpose of the laws was to maintain order in a 
multi-religious society and to prevent attacks against members of any 
religion.9 However, after the creation of Pakistan, the push by some 
Muslim fundamentalist groups to turn Pakistan into a Sunni Islamic 
theocracy began in the 1950s.10 In 1973, these efforts culminated in 
the Constitution’s Repugnancy Clause, Article 227(1).11 Article 
227(1) provides that: “[a]ll existing laws shall be brought in 
conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy 
Quran and Sunnah, in this Part referred to as the Injunctions of 
Islam, and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such 
Injunctions.”12 To ensure that the “Injunctions of Islam” are 
followed, the Constitution further established the Islamic Council, a 
type of Islamic think-tank for Parliament and the Provincial 
Assemblies.13 General Zia-ul-Haq (Zia) translated these changes into 
the country’s blasphemy laws.14 In 1977, as part of his Islamization 
efforts, Zia imposed martial law on Pakistan and “assumed for 
himself the power of amending the Constitution.”15 One of his many 
amendments was the addition of five new sections typically referred 
to as the blasphemy laws.16 
 
 7. Asma T. Uddin, A Legal Analysis of Ahmadi Persecution in Pakistan, in STATE RESPONSES TO 
MINORITY RELIGIONS 81, 82 (David M. Kirkham ed., 2013). 
 8. Osama Siddique & Zahra Hayat, Unholy Speech and Holy Laws: Blasphemy Laws in 
Pakistan—Controversial Origins, Design Defects, and Free Speech Implications, 17 MINN. J. 
INTL L. 303, 336 (2008). 
9.  Id. at 337 (“[I]t would appear that the purpose of Chapter 15 was the maintenance 
of order in a multi-religious society and the containment of attacks targeted at any religion.”). 
 10. Uddin, supra note 7, at 83. 
 11. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 227, § 1. 
 12. Id. 
 13. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 230, § 1. 
 14. Siddique, supra note 8, at 310–12. 
 15. Id. at 314. 
 16. Id. at 310–12. 
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Since the end of Zia’s regime, the number of blasphemy cases 
has continued to increase.17 As of June, Pakistan used its blasphemy 
laws to put four people on death row in 2014, now adding up to 
seventeen total waiting execution.18 Nineteen people are 
imprisoned for life and sixty-eight attorneys were charged in May 
2014 with this same crime after “protest[ing] police abuse.”19 Not 
surprisingly, Pakistan leads the world in the number of people jailed 
for blasphemy.20 
However, there is some hope. When making their decisions, 
Pakistani domestic courts have referenced U.S. case law. As will be 
discussed below, the highest court in Pakistan referenced five U.S. 
Supreme Court cases to justify speech restrictions on religious 
minorities.21 The courts have also referenced it at least twice when 
dealing with other free speech issues.22 In fact, the court has looked 
to the United States for issues outside of freedom of speech as well.23 
All of this suggests that, at minimum, they are relying on U.S. case 
law to legitimize their opinions (even if they may be intentionally 
misinterpreting the U.S. law) and, at most, looking to the United 
States for legal guidance. 
A recent suo moto24 Pakistani Supreme Court decision (hereafter, 
“S.M.C. NO. 1 OF 2014”) also offers hope.25 The decision came in 
 
 17. Id. at 324–27. According to one study, there were only twelve blasphemy cases in 
the 1980s during General Zia’s regime, but the following decade saw that number triple, and 
from 2000–2007 that number increased again to forty-eight. Id. at 325. 
 18. Thomas J. Reese & Daniel I. Mark, Pakistan’s War on Conscience, THE 
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (June 8, 2014), http://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/op-eds/the-
philadelphia-inquirer-pakistans-war-conscience. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Zaheeruddin v. State, (1993) 26 SCMR (SC) 1718 (Pak.). 
 22. See, e.g., Syed Masroor Ahsan and Others v. Ardeshir Cowasjee and Others, (1998) 
PLD (SC) 823 (Pak.) (citing Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947); Muhammad Nawaz 
Sharif v. President of Pakistan and Others, (1993) PLD (SC) 473 (Pak.)). 
 23. Watan Party v. Federation of Pakistan, (2011) PLD (SC) 997 (Pak.); Justice 
Tassaduq Hussain Jillani, The Rule of Law and the Supreme Court of Pakistan, INT’L ASS’N OF 
SUPREME ADMIN. JURISDICTIONS, available at 
http://www.aihja.org/images/users/1/files/pakistan.national .report_pakistan.en.0.pdf 
(referencing a U.S. Supreme Court case and Martin Luther King, Jr.). 
 24. “Suo moto is a Latin term meaning ‘on its own motion.’ It is used in situations 
where a government or court official acts of its own initiative.” Suo Moto Law & Legal 
Definition, USLEGAL.COM, http://definitions.uslegal.com/s/suo-moto/. 
 25. (2014) S.M.C. No. 1 of 2014 (SC) (Pak.), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/smc_1_2014.pdf. 
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the aftermath of a series of complaints from different religious 
communities (including Christians, Hindus, the Kalash tribe, and 
Ismailis) about harassment and violence.26 These incidents included a 
2013 suicide bomb attack on a Peshawar church that killed eighty-
one people;27 attempts at forced conversion of members of the 
Kalash tribe and Ismailis in Chitral to a different sect within Islam;28 
and the frequent desecration of Hindu temples.29 In addressing these 
incidents, the court explained the special legal protection that the 
Pakistan Constitution affords to minorities.30 Chief Justice Jillani, 
quoting a professor from Seattle University School of Law, stated 
that “[t]he express guarantees for freedom of belief and practice of 
religion, rule of law, due process, equal protection, and a progressive 
legislative agenda, proffered by the leadership of the Pakistan 
Movement, constitute an implied social covenant with religious 
minorities in Pakistan.”31 Jillani also explained that Pakistan’s origins 
lie in the principle of liberty for all:32 “One of the famous Fourteen 
Points enumerated by Mohammad Ali Jinnah on proposed 
constitutional changes was that ‘full religious liberty, i.e. liberty of 
belief, worship and observance, propaganda, association and 
education shall be guaranteed to [all] communities.’”33 
As will be examined in detail below, the opinion reflects a 
remarkable change in tone compared to recent judicial treatments of 
religion-based violence.34 And again, it uses the U.S. cultural and 
legal context to bolster its broad interpretation of religious freedom. 
The court not only quotes an American law professor, but in 
explaining that the country must “undo the injustices done to the 
minorities,” the court relies on the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
Brown v. Board of Education.35 
 
 26. Id. at 4. 
 27. Id. at 2, 4. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 4. 
 30. Id. at 11–12. 
 31. Id. at 12. 
 32. Id. at 12–13. 
 33. Id. at 12 (citing Sekrut Yakhni, The Fourteen Points of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad 
Ali Jinnah, PAKISTAN DEFENCE (Aug. 14, 2010), http://defence.pk/threads/the-fourteen-
points-of-quaid-e-azam-muhammad-ali-jinnah.69201/). 
 34. See infra Part II. 
 35. S.M.C. No. 1 of 2014 at 26 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
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Yet, while this case is a major step in the right direction, much 
work lies ahead in ensuring religious liberty in Pakistan. Even as 
Jillani explained in detail the rights afforded to religious minorities 
and the religious “conscience” under Article 20 of the Constitution, 
he completely failed to mention Pakistan’s extensive list of globally-
notorious blasphemy laws, which on their face violate any 
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.36 So long as blasphemy 
laws continue to fuel religion-based violence, little will change in the 
courts and in the community. 
Pakistani courts—like many courts struggling with the treatment 
of potentially controversial speech—are concerned about public 
order. Their concern is that blasphemous speech runs the risk of 
angering people, who will then become violent. Even though the 
court acknowledged in this case that “general restrictions of law, 
public order and morality . . . cannot be interpreted or used in such a 
restrictive way as to curtail the basic essence and meaning of the pre-
eminent right to religious conscience,”37 the likelihood of the court 
applying this principle to alleged blasphemy remains uncertain. 
This Paper tackles the issue of public order concerns as applied to 
religious speech. It argues that the United States was also worried 
about public order early on in the development of its free speech 
jurisprudence, but moved past it (the sections below on the U.S. law 
demonstrate how and why). Because of these similar experiences, 
U.S. history and jurisprudence provide useful guidance to nations 
trying to balance between free speech protection and the 
preservation of public order. 
 
B. Similar Challenges in Other Muslim-majority Countries 
 
Importantly, Pakistan is not alone in either its abuses or its use of 
American court language to justify restricting speech in the name of 
public order.38 In the wake of the Arab Spring, other Muslim-
 
 36. Id. at 17–21. 
 37. Id. at 18. 
 38. See, e.g., Jacey Fortin, Saudi Arabia Suggests Global Internet Regulations to Preserve 
‘Public Order’, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.ibtimes.com/saudi-arabia-
suggests-global-internet-regulations-preserve-public-order-845179. For example, when Saudi 
Arabia recently pushed for greater Internet regulations, it did so because “there is a crying 
need for international collaboration to address ‘freedom of expression,’ which clearly 
disregards public order.” Id. 
UDDIN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2016  9:17 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
734 
majority countries are also looking to U.S. law as a source of 
guidance. This Paper’s argument is thus applicable beyond the case 
of Pakistan. 
Tunisia provides one of the clearest examples. In June 2012, 
extremist Muslims across the country rioted and the governing 
Islamic party, Ennahda,39 linked the riots to art displays and films 
that allegedly disrespected Islam.40 The government continued to 
punish the artists.41 In response, Ennahda proposed constitutional 
 
 39. Monica Marks, Speaking on the Unspeakable: Blasphemy and the Tunisian 
Constitution, SADA J. (Sept. 4, 2012), 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/04/speaking-on-unspeakable-blasphemy-tunisian-
constitution/drca. 
 40. There were several examples of riots allegedly caused because of art displays and 
films, including: 1) an art display in La Marsa. John Thorne, Books and Art Pit Freedom of 
Religion Against Free Speech in Tunisia, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 17, 2012), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0817/Books-and-art-pit-freedom-
of-religion-against-free-speech-in-Tunisia/(page)/2; 2) Nadia El-Fani’s film, “No God, No 
Master,” Persepolis Verdict Exposes Misuse of Blasphemy Laws in Tunisia, HUM. RTS. FIRST (May 
04, 2012), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/persepolis-verdict-exposes-misuse-
blasphemy-laws-tunisia (drawing opposition simply because of the film’s title); 3) Andrew 
Hammond, “No God” Film Angers Tunisian Islamists, REUTERS (Jul. 6, 2011, 9:25 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com /article/2011/07/06/ozatp-tunisia-islamists-tension-
idAFJOE7650F320110706; and 4) Marjane Satrapi’s animated film, “Persepolis,” Marc 
Fisher, Tunisian Court Finds Broadcaster Guilty in Showing God’s Image, WASH. POST (May 3, 
2012) http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/ tunisian-who-showed-persepolis-on-
tv-fined-in-free-speech-case/2012/05/03/gIQA0GpzyT_story.html (outraging some 
Muslims because it portrayed God in human form with the Washington Post reporting that the 
part of “Persepolis” in question involved God telling a “young girl to act in an honest and 
forthright manner”). 
 41. The Tunisian government has persisted in prosecuting both the artists from La 
Marsa and the TV station that aired “Persepolis.” In the latter, a trial court convicted the 
station’s owner of causing “troubles to the public order” and “offence [sic] to good morals.” 
Tunisian Court Fines TV Station Boss for Airing Animated Film Persepolis, GUARDIAN (May 3, 
2012, 10:35 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/03/tunisian-court-tv-
station-persepolis. He was fined the equivalent of $1,600, and two employees were fined the 
equivalent of $800 each. See Fisher, supra note 40. The Tunisian court gave no explanation for 
its decision. Id. Some Muslim clerics defended the charges because “the movie insulted Islamic 
values by showing the face of God.” Id. Meanwhile, charges are still pending against Nadia 
Jelassi and Mohamed Ben Salem, two sculptors involved in the La Marsa display, for disrupting 
the public order. Tunisia: Hollande Should Raise Rights Concerns, HUM. RTS. WATCH, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/02/tunisia-hollande-should-raise-rights-concerns (last 
updated July 1, 2013). As the same post goes on to note, there have also been prosecutions 
and convictions for nonviolent speech, including a song called “Cops are Dogs,” accusing 
officials of dereliction of duty in the decision to extradite the former Libyan prime minister, 
calling on the defense minister to open an investigation against the director of a military 
hospital, criticizing the general rapporteur of the legislature, and accusing a former foreign 
minister of misuse of public funds. Id. By persisting with these prosecutions, Tunisia has 
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provisions that would criminalize “all attacks on that which is 
sacred,”42 justifying them on the need for public order with some 
even invoking the famous dictum from Schenck v. United States about 
shouting “fire!” in a crowded theater.43 
However, the language was not adopted later44 and Tunisia’s 
newly ratified Constitution45 instead has a vague clause that the 
government “commits itself . . . to the protection of the sacred,” 
suggesting that the State is still empowered to potentially outlaw 
 
continued to misunderstand the public order exception to free speech even after dropping the 
controversial constitutional provision. 
 42. See Marks, supra note 39. A proposed “Sacred Values” law would also have imposed 
prison terms or fines for insulting or mocking the “sanctity of religion” and for “insults, 
profanity, derision and representation of Allah and Mohammed.”Ennahda Proposes Blasphemy 
Law in Tunisia, PROJECT ON MIDDLE EAST DEMOCRACY BLOG (D.C.), pomed.org/blog-
post/human-rights/blasphemy-law/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2015). 
 43. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The theory was that insults to Islam would produce 
violence, so any affront to Islam should be punished. See Marks, supra note 39. Unfortunately, 
although the language about shouting fire is more colorful than Brandenburg, that case is now 
obsolete. As the history of the “clear and present danger” standard will reveal later in the 
Paper, those words can be stretched to restrict a great deal of speech. The Brandenburg 
standard, on the other hand, is remarkably protective of speech, strictly requiring imminence 
and intent. 
 44. The bill and proposed constitutional provision were later withdrawn. In doing so, 
National Constituent Assembly Speaker Mustapha Ben Jafaar explained: “[T]he sacred is 
something very, very difficult to define. Its boundaries are blurred and one could interpret it in 
one way or another, in an exaggerated way.” Tunisia Plans to Outlaw Blasphemy Dropped, 
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 12, 2012, 9:30 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/tunisia/9605965/Tuni
sia-plans-to-outlaw-blasphemy-dropped.html. Jafaar also commented that “freedom of 
expression and of the press” were “a fundamental achievement of the revolution that should 
never be called into question, and that no one should be able to challenge.” Id. The change 
came on the heels of criticism from UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, 
Margaret Sekaggya, and other human rights groups. See, e.g., id. 
 45. Article 6 deals specifically with religious liberty:  
The State is the guardian of religion. It guarantees liberty of conscience and of 
belief, the free exercise of religious worship and the neutrality of the mosques and of 
the places of worship from all partisan instrumentalization. The State commits itself 
to the dissemination of the values of moderation and tolerance and to the protection 
of the sacred and the prohibition of any offense thereto. It commits itself, equally, to 
the prohibition of, and the fight against, appeals to Takfir [charges of apostasy] and 
incitement to violence and hatred.  
Amna Guellali, The Problem with Tunisia’s New Constitution, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 3, 
2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/03/problem-tunisia-s-new-constitution 
(quoting CONSTITUTION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC, 2014, art. 6, available at 
http://www.jasmine-foundation.org/doc/unofficial_english_translation_of_tunisian_constitut
ion_final_ed.pdf  [hereinafter Constitution]). 
UDDIN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2016  9:17 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
736 
blasphemy.46 But some argue that other provisions in the 
Constitution will help balance against government overreach in this 
area.47 The Constitution also provides several protections for 
freedom of expression,48 but seeks to balance this freedom with the 
prevention of violence.49 Now, it will be up to the courts to 
 
 46. See Guellali, supra note 45 (“Article 6 attempts the impossible task of reconciling 
two radically different visions of society. On the one hand, it caters to a hyper-religious 
audience that sees the government as a watchdog and protector of all things sacred. At the 
same time, the article describes a society that leaves each person the freedom of religious 
choice, without intrusion or interference. The two irreconcilable visions are forced together in 
a complicated and wordy fashion.”); Tunisia Signs New Constitution, GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 
2014, 10:38 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/tunisia-signs-new-
constitution-progressive/print. 
 47. See Tunisia Signs New Constitution, supra note 46 (“‘This formulation [regarding 
protecting the sacred] is vague and gives too much leeway to the legislators to trample other 
rights such as the right to free expression, artistic creation and academic freedoms,’ said Amna 
Guelleli, of the charity Human Rights Watch. ‘However, the risk is reduced given the strong 
safeguards [in place in other articles] against overly broad interpretations.’”); Carlotta Gall, 
Tunisian Constitution, Praised for Balance, Nears Passage, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2014), 
www.nytimes.com/ 2014/01/15/world/africa/tunisian-constitution-praised-for-balance-
nears-passage.html?_r=1 (“But Mr. Fehri, the secular politician, said the balance was necessary. 
‘Our opinion is different, so you have two explanations for the same thing,’ he said, referring 
to an assembly member who is also an imam, who praised the first article from an Islamic point 
of view. ‘So when it comes to interpretation, they will take both into account.’”). One article 
even suggested that the text would potentially “permit atheism and the practice of non-
Abrahamic religions frowned upon in other Islamic countries.” Tunisia Signs New 
Constitution, supra note 46. 
 48. “Freedom of opinion, thought, expression, information and publication shall be 
guaranteed. These freedoms shall not be subject to prior censorship.” CONSTITUTION, art. 31 
(emphasis added). “The Audio-Visual Communication Commission shall . . . seek to 
guarantee freedoms of expression and of the media and the existence of pluralistic and fair 
media.” Id. art. 127 (emphasis added). 
 49. Article 6 contains “the first constitutional condemnation of takfir [calling someone 
an apostate] in the Arab region.” Mohammad al-Hayat, Tunisia’s New Constitution 
Criminalizes ‘Takfir’, AL-MONITOR (D.C.) (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/02 /tunisia-new-constitution-bans-takfir.html#. Takfirs 
are “religious edicts claiming someone is an apostate” that often lead to death threats and 
assassination attempts on the person. Id. Some argue that this ban was unnecessary and 
conflicts with freedom of expression. See Asma Ghribi, The Problem with Tunisia’s New 
Constitution, FOREIGN POL’Y (D.C.) (Jan. 9, 2014, 11:13 AM),  
http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/01/09/the_problem_with_tunisias_new_c
onstitution (“Constitutional expert Slim Loghmani said that Tunisia does not need to 
criminalize apostasy because incitement to violence is already banned in the Tunisian penal 
code. . . . This article [Article 6] limits the freedom of expression, because it fails to provide a 
clear definition of apostasy, and does not specify whether apostasy is prohibited in all cases, or 
only when it implies an incitement to violence. The opposition presents itself as a bulwark 
against creeping Islamization and conservative attempts to curb liberties. But in their efforts to 
prevent themselves from being dismissed as infidels, members of the secular opposition have 
actually pushed for a provision that limits freedom of speech—specifically, the freedom of 
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determine how to interpret this balance and they may look to the 
United States for guidance. 
Indonesia has also recently grappled with the same issue.50 In 
response to a 2010 case seeking the repeal of Indonesia’s Blasphemy 
Act,51 the country’s highest court—the Constitutional Court—
upheld the Act on public order grounds based on the International 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).52 The Indonesian 
Blasphemy Act prohibits speech promoting “an interpretation of a 
religion or a form of religious activity that is similar to the 
interpretations or activities of an Indonesian religion but deviates 
from the tenets of that religion.”53 It also includes a criminal 
prohibition on speech that “principally ha[s] the character of being 
at enmity with, abusing or staining a religion adhered to in 
Indonesia,” or expression with “the intention to prevent a person to 
adhere to any religion based on the belief of the almighty God.”54 
 
speech for Islamists. The secularists did this by taking away the Islamists’ most powerful 
rhetorical tool: religion.”); Sarah Mersch, Tunisia’s Compromise Constitution, SADA J. (D.C.) 
(Jan. 21, 2014), http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2014/ 01/21/stunisia-s-compromise-
constitution/gyzc (“Protection of the sacred and the freedom of conscience and faith do not 
go together—and neither do the interdiction against accusing somebody of apostasy and the 
freedom of expression (guaranteed in article 30).”); See also CONSTITUTION, art. 35 (“The 
freedom to establish . . . associations is guaranteed. . . . [A]ssociations must abide . . . by the 
constitution, the law . . . and the rejection of violence.”); (“The law shall determine the 
limitations related to the rights and freedoms that are guaranteed by this Constitution and their 
exercise, on the condition that it does not compromise their essence. These limitations can only be 
put in place where necessary in a civil democratic state, with the aim of protecting the rights of 
others or based on the requirements of public order, national defense, public health or public morals. 
Proportionality between these limitations and their motives must be respected. Judicial authorities 
shall ensure that rights and freedoms are protected from all violations. No amendment that 
undermines any human rights acquisitions or freedoms guaranteed in this Constitutions is 
allowed.”) (emphasis added) Id. art. 49. 
 50. See Syamsul Arifin, Indonesian Discourse on Human Rights and Freedom of Religion 
or Belief: Muslim Perspectives, 2012 BYU L. REV. 775, 808 (discussing that an Indonesian 
Muslim party leader, Zallum, sees “freedom of religion [and] freedom of speech” as 
“contradictory to Islam”). 
 51. See Decision No. 140/PUU-VII/2009, Indonesian Constitutional Court (April 
19, 2010). 
 52. This was the primary international law instrument at issue in the case. 
 53. W. Cole Durham, Forward to THE LEGAL TRAINING INSTITUTE, INDONESIA: A 
RESOURCE GUIDE FROM THE LEGAL TRAINING INSTITUTE iii (2012) [hereinafter RESOURCE 
GUIDE], http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Indonesia-Resource-
Book-Final-5-2011.pdf. 
 54. Id. at 134 (quoting Criminal Code of Indonesia art. 156(a) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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The court’s opinion does not cite U.S. case law, but it does 
grapple with public order exceptions in a way that invites 
international comparison. The court used Article 19, paragraph 
(3) which states that the right to freedom of expression “carries 
with it special duties and responsibilities,” including restrictions 
“[f]or the protection of national security or of public order (ordre 
public).”55  The court also relied on Article 18 of the ICCPR, 
which states that religious freedom “may be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect 
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of others.”56 The court held that these treaties 
justified the Blasphemy Act’s censure of religious interpretations 
that “could trigger reactions that threaten security and public 
order if [they are] expressed or practiced in public.”57 In other 
words, the government could limit blasphemous statements as a 
means of preserving public order. 
But the Indonesian court construed the public order exception 
too broadly. The official commentary of the U.N. Human Rights 
Committee explains that “[l]imitations . . . must be directly related 
and proportionate to the specific need on which they are predicated. 
Restrictions may not be . . . applied in a discriminatory manner.”58 
The Blasphemy Act is neither directly related nor proportionate to 
the specific need at issue, and is not applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner. It prohibits public communication of support for an 
unofficial religion (i.e. not Islam, Protestant Christianity, 
Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, or Confucianism), rather than 
simply prohibiting communications on religious subjects that incite 
individuals to violence.59 And the Act’s officially acknowledged 
purpose is to “channel . . . religiosity” towards the approved 
religions, rather than to treat all religions equally.60 The Indonesian 
 
 55. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 19 ¶ 3, International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 56. Id. art. 18 ¶ 3. 
 57. Translation of Decision No. 140/PUU-VII/2009, Indonesian Constitutional 
Court, [3.52] (April 19, 2010). 
 58. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 22: Freedom of thought, 
conscience or religion, art. 18, ¶ 8, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (July 30, 1993) 
(emphasis added). 
 59. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 53, at 6. 
 60. Enactment of the President of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 1/PNPS of 1965 
Concerning the Prevention of Religious Abuse and/or Defamation, § I(3). 
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court thereby misinterpreted the public order exception, conflating it 
with blasphemy prohibitions and, in so doing, undeservedly 
legitimized these prohibitions. 
Because of these misunderstandings, it is important for policy 
makers to be educated on the limits of the public order exceptions 
and how they can be corrected. For Pakistan, this begins with 
learning about its own development of laws on religious speech. 
II. RELIGION IS DIFFERENT: PAKISTAN’S INCONSISTENT SPEECH 
JURISPRUDENCE 
As this Part will show, Pakistani courts have drawn heavily on the 
old U.S. conception of public order exceptions to free speech in 
interpreting its blasphemy laws. Yet these courts misunderstand the 
U.S. standard and, more broadly, the public order exception in 
international law.  
A. Impact of General Zia Amendments 
To better understand the Pakistani blasphemy laws in their 
current state, it is helpful to compare Chapter 15 of the Pakistani 
Penal Code, Of Offenses Relating to Religion, before and after 
General Zia’s amendments in the 1980s. The table below 
compares the language of the Penal Code before and after 
General Zia’s amendments. 
Penal Code Comparison: Pre & Post General Zia Amendments61 
Adopted Indian Penal Code General Zia Amendments 
Section 295: Whoever destroys, 
damages or defiles any place of 
worship, or any object held sacred 
by any class of persons with the 
intention of thereby insulting the 
religion of any class of persons or 
Section 295–B. Defiling, etc., of 
Holy Qur’an: Whoever wilfully 
[sic] defiles, damages or desecrates a 
copy of the Holy Qur’an or of an 
extract therefrom or uses it in any 
derogatory manner or for any 
 
 61. Underlined words deal with mens rea. Italicized words deal with key aspects of 
the text. 
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with the knowledge that any 
class of persons is likely to consider 
such destruction, damage or 
defilement as an insult to their 
religion, shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may 
extend to two years, or with fine, 
or with both.62 
unlawful purpose shall be punishable 
with imprisonment for life.63 
Section 298: Whoever, with the 
deliberate intention of wounding 
the religious feelings of any person, 
utters any word or makes any 
sound in the hearing of that 
person or makes any gesture in 
the sight of that person or places 
any object in the sight of that 
person, shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may 
extend to one year, or with fine, 
or with both.64 
Section 295–C. Use of 
derogatory remarks, etc., in 
respect of the Holy Prophet: 
Whoever by words, either spoken 
or written, or by visible 
representation or by any 
imputation, innuendo, or 
insinuation, directly or indirectly, 
defiles the sacred name of the Holy 
Prophet Muhammad (peace be 
upon him) shall be punished with 
death, or imprisonment for life, 
and shall also be liable to fine.65 
Section 295–A: Whoever, with 
deliberate and malicious 
intention of outraging the 
‘religious feelings of any class of 
[the citizens of Pakistan],66 by 
words, either spoken or written, 
or by visible representations, 
insults or attempts to insult the 
religion or the religious beliefs of 
Section 298–B. Misuse of 
epithets, descriptions and 
titles, etc., reserved for certain 
holy personages or places: 
(1) Any . . . ‘Ahmadis’ . . . 
who . . . (a) refers to . . . any 
person, other than a Caliph or 
companion of the Holy Prophet 
Muhammad . . . as “Ameer-ul-
 
 62. The Penal Code Act, No. XLV of 1860, PEN. CODE (1860) ,ch. XV, § 295 
(emphasis added) [hereinafter IPC]. 
 63. Pakistan Penal Code Act, No. XLV of 1860, PAK. PEN. CODE (1982), ch. XV § 
295–B, added by P.P.C. Ordinance, I of 1982 (emphasis added) [hereinafter PPC]. 
 64. IPC ch. XV, § 298 (emphasis added). 
 65. PPC ch. XV § 295–C (emphasis added). 
 66. The phrase “citizens of Pakistan” replaced the Indian Penal Code’s phrase “His 
Majesty’s subjects” by Adaption Order 1961, art. 2 (w.e.f. Mar. 23, 1956). See I PPC ch. XV § 
295–A, n.2 (1982).  
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that class, shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may 
extend to two years, or with fine, 
or with both.67 
Mumineen”, “Khalifatul-
Mumineen”, “Khalifa-tul-
Muslimeen”, “Sahaabi” or “Razi 
Allah Anho”; 
(b) refers to . . . any person, 
other than a wife of the Holy 
Prophet Muhammad . . . as 
“Ummul-Mumineen”; 
(c) refers to . . . any person, 
other than a member of the 
family “Ahle-bait” of the Holy 
Prophet Muhammad . . . as 
“Ahle-bait”; or 
(d) refers to . . . his place of 
worship a “Masjid” shall be 
punished with imprisonment of 
either description for a term 
which may extend to three years, 
and shall also be liable to fine.68 
Chapter 15 Preface: The 
principle on which this chapter 
has been framed is a principle on 
which it would be desirable that 
all Governments should act, but 
from which the British 
Government in India cannot 
depart without risking the 
dissolution of society ; it is this, 
that every man should be suffered 
to profess his own religion, and 
that no man should be suffered to 
insult the religion of another.69 
Section 298–C. Person of 
Quadiani group, etc., calling 
himself a Muslim or preaching 
or propagating his faith: 
Any . . . ‘Ahmadis’ . . . who 
directly or indirectly, poses himself 
as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, 
his faith as Islam, or preaches or 
propagates his faith, or invites 
others to accept his faith, by 
words, either spoken or written, 
or by visible representations, or 
in any manner whatsoever 
outrages the religious feelings of 
Muslims shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may 
 
 67. INDIA PEN. CODE, supra note 62, at 1328 (emphasis added). 
 68. PPC ch. XV § 298–B (emphasis added). 
 69. INDIA PEN. CODE AS ORIGINALLY FRAMED IN 1837, 136 (1888). 
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extend to three years and shall 
also be liable to fine.70 
 
Chapter 15 originated from the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 
1860), which the British colonial government enacted for the Indian 
subcontinent in October 1860.71 As seen above in the preface to 
Chapter 15, the Law Commissioner’s main motivation for its 
inclusion in the Indian Penal Code was to maintain “order in a 
multi-religious society” and prevent attacks targeting any religion.72 
Moreover, given the fact that Muslims formed a minority in the 
Indian subcontinent prior to its partition, “it appears plausible that 
part of the motivation for inclusion of this chapter was the 
protection of religious rights of minorities.”73 In a recent Lahore 
High Court judgment, Justice Ali Nawaz Chohan corroborated this 
view: “Historically speaking, [these laws were] enacted by the British 
to protect the religious sentiments of the Muslim minorities in the 
subcontinent before partition against the Hindu majority.”74 
However, while the drafters were specifically thinking of Islam, 
they were doing so because of its status as a minority religion and 
thus were making this law not only for the protection of Islam, but 
also for any minority religion.75 As seen in the table above, Sections 
295 and 298 reflect these concerns. The language protects “any 
person”76 or “any class of persons,”77 not just the majority religion, 
and it does not discriminate against any religion.78 In 1927, this 
pattern continued with the insertion of Section 295-A by the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act of XXV of 1927.79 In their original 
form, sections 295, 295–A and 298 of Chapter 15 were clearly 
intended to apply to all religions.80 
 
 70. PPC ch. XV sec. 298–C (emphasis added). 
 71. See Siddique & Hayat, supra note 8, at 336. 
 72. Id. at 337 (emphasis in original). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. (quoting Muhammad Mahboob v. State, (2002) 54 PLD (Lahore) 587, 
597 (Pak.)). 
 75. Id. 
 76. PPC ch. XV § 295–C. 
 77. Id. at § 298. 
 78. Siddique & Hayat, supra note 8. 
 79. Id. at 338. 
 80. Id. 
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In contrast, and as will be described further below, the 
blasphemy laws in their current form “pertain specifically to the 
protection of Islam.”81 For example, Section 295–B “pertains only to 
the defilement of the Holy Quran.”82 Section 295–C focuses 
exclusively on “derogatory remarks against [the Prophet] 
Muhammad.”83 And Sections 298–B and 298–C deal exclusively 
with the punishment of Ahmadis.84 
The Ahmadiyya is a minority religious group founded in the late 
nineteenth century by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.85 Ahmadis consider 
themselves Muslims, although other Muslims disagree because of the 
group’s variant belief about the finality of Prophet Muhammad’s 
prophethood.86 Anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment was relatively absent at 
the time of Pakistan’s founding and Pakistan’s courts decided several 
cases in favor of Ahmadi freedom of religion and speech in the 
1960s.87 But anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment has intensified in the years 
since and was codified into law in the 1980s by General Zia-ul-Haq. 
In particular, the 1983 Ordinance XX criminalized various forms of 
Ahmadi worship and speech.88 More than a thousand people have 
been arrested under the blasphemy laws, forty percent of them 
Ahmadi.89 “Sections 298B and 298C of Pakistan’s Penal Code, 
added in 1984 through Ordinance XX, are dedicated entirely to the 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 312. 
 86. Id. at 312 n.10. 
 87. See Abdur Rahman Mobashir v. Amir Ali Shah Bokhari, (1978) PLD (Lahore) 113 
(Pak.) (holding “no law or legal right can be used to prevent Ahmadis from worshipping freely 
and calling their house of worship a ‘masjid,’ religious terms are not property, and public 
nuisance law cannot be used to punish Ahmadis for praying and reciting the call to prayer”); 
Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri v. Province of West Pak., (1969) 21 PLD (Lahore) 289 (1968) 
(Pak.) (holding freedom to profess Ahmadi religion is protected and civil courts cannot answer 
who is Muslim). 
 88. See Ordinance No. XX of 1984The Gazette of Pakistan Islamabad, Thursday, 26 
April 1984No.F.17(1)84-Pub, available at http://defence.pk/threads/ordinance-xx-that-
bars-a-muslim-being-called-muslim-in-pakistan.379610/; see also PAKISTAN CONST. Pt XII, 
ch.5 art. 260 (3)(b); PAKISTAN CONST. Pt XV, ch.5 art. 298-B, 298-C, available at 
http://www.pakistani.org /pakistan/legislation/1860/actXLVof1860.html. 
 89. Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission: Hearing before H. Comm. on Foreign 
Affairs, 112th Cong., 3–4 (2012) (testimony of Amjad Mahmood Khan, Esq., UCLA Law 
Professor), available at http://tlhrc.house.gov/docs/transcripts/2012_3_21_South%20Asia/ 
Amjad%20Khan%20 Testimony.pdf. 
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persecution of Ahmadis,” prohibiting them from declaring their faith 
publicly, calling themselves Muslims, building mosques, and 
engaging in most other religious activities.90 
In comparing the Pakistani Penal Code’s original sections of 
Chapter 15 and the current blasphemy laws as General Zia enacted 
them in the 1980s, another fundamental difference is the elimination 
of any intent requirement as a mens rea of the offense.91 
The 1860 and 1927 versions of the Indian Penal Code. . . 
emphasize[d] the intention of the accused, as evidenced by the[] 
inclusion of the following requirements in the relevant provisions” 
of Section 295 and 298: “‘with the intention of thereby insulting 
the religion of any class of persons or with the knowledge that any 
class of persons is likely to consider such destruction, damage or 
defilement as an insult to their religion” in Section 295; “with the 
deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious 
feelings of any class of citizens of Pakistan” in Section 295–A; and 
“with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of 
any person” in Section 298.92 
However, General Zia’s amendments are nearly devoid of any 
mens rea.93 The only exception is section 295–B: “whoever wilfully 
[sic] defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Qur’an.”94 
The new provisions in sections 295 and 298 fail to use any form of 
mens rea: “by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or 
indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet 
Muhammad”95 in Section 295–C (or of any family members “of the 
Holy Prophet” in Section 298-A)96; “Any . . . ‘Ahmadis’ . . . who . . . 
refers to”97 in Section 298–B; and “directly or indirectly, poses himself 
as a Muslim, . . . or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious 
feelings of Muslims”98 in Section 298–C.99 Thus, these amendments 
 
 90. Uddin, supra note 7, at 82; see also Syamsul Arifin, Indonesian Discourse on Human 
Rights and Freedom of Religion or Belief: Muslim Perspectives, 2012 BYU L. Rev. 775, 777–78 
(discussing the persecution of the Ahmadi faith in Indonesia). 
 91. Siddique & Hayat, supra note 8, at 340. 
 92. Id. (quoting IPC,ch. XV, §§ 295, 295–A, 298) (emphasis added). 
 93. See id. at 339–40. 
 94. PPC ch. XV § 295–B (emphasis added). 
 95. Id. § 295–C (emphasis added). 
 96. Id. § 298–A (emphasis added). 
 97. Id. § 298–B(2) (emphasis added). 
 98. Id. § 298–C (emphasis added). 
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are based on strict liability, making it easier for the government to 
prove that a person has committed blasphemy against Islam.100 
B. Case Comparison 
Next, it is important to understand the differences in case law 
before and after the Zia amendments.101 The case of Punjab 
Religious Book Society of Lahore v. State102 exemplifies the Pakistan 
Supreme Court’s understanding of Chapter 15’s “Offenses Relating 
to Religion” intent requirement prior to General Zia’s enactment of 
the blasphemy laws in the 1980s.103 The Society had published a 
book entitled “Mizan-ul-Haq” comparing Islam and Christianity, 
which the Home Department declared was “calculated to outrage 
the religious feelings of the Muslims of Pakistan and publication of 
which is punishable under Section 295-A of the Pakistan Penal 
Code.”104 But the court disagreed.105 Even though the court found 
that the “[author’s] object was to show the superiority of 
Christianity over Islam,” it also found that “he ha[d] said at more 
places than one that he had no intention of injuring the feelings of 
Muslims whom at places he called his brethren.”106 
The court’s reasoning hinges on the mens rea aspect of the 
crime, not on the book’s potential effect on its readers. The court 
held that this intent requirement “is not just the ordinary intention 
that one finds mentioned with regard to almost all other offences 
[sic] . . . but a deliberate and malicious intention to do the thing 
mentioned therein.”107 The court went on to note that the “laws of 
Pakistan . . . do not forbid religious discussions and preaching,” so 
if “a person engaged in a religious discussion is merely attempting 
 
 99. See Siddique & Hayat, supra note 8, at 340–41. 
 100. See id. at 337. 
 101. Many of these ideas come thanks to the great work of others. See id. 
 102. (1960) 12 PLD (Lahore) 629 (Pak.). 
 103. Siddique & Hayat, supra note 8, at 341–42. 
 104. Id. at 341 (quoting Punjab Religious Book Society v. State, (1960) 12 PLD 
(Lahore) 629 (Pak.)). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. (quoting Punjab Religious Book Society v. State, (1960) 12 PLD (Lahore) 629, 
631 (Pak.)) (emphasis added); see also Muhammad Khalil v. State, (1962) 14 PLD (Lahore) 
850 (Pak.) (addressing similar facts and confirming the same interpretation of Section 295–A’s 
intent requirement). 
 107. Siddique & Hayat, supra note 8, at 341 (quoting Punjab Religious Book Society v. 
State, (1960) 12 PLD (Lahore) 629, 637 (Pak.)). 
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to show that the religion he is advocating is the best in the world, 
he is not doing anything to which the law takes exception.”108 The 
court would only presume a deliberate and malicious intent when 
the conduct of the accused “is extremely offensive and has no 
reliable source to justify its acceptance as correct” or if the 
“argument in favour [sic] of one religion has sunk to the level of 
abuse to another.”109 
This initial emphasis on Chapter 15’s intent requirement and 
general applicability to all religions is in stark contrast to the 
blasphemy laws enacted under General Zia, which eliminated the 
“deliberate and malicious” intent requirement, and focused 
exclusively on offenses against Islam.110 Additionally, and as will be 
described further below, the blasphemy laws in their current form 
“lack any nexus with the prerequisite of a causation of any breach of 
peace, and in that sense are strict liability offenses.”111 
In 1993, the court handed down Zaheeruddin v. State, the major 
case on freedom of speech and religion under the blasphemy laws in 
their current form.112 It upheld convictions under Ordinance XX and 
section 295(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code by a three-to-two vote.113 
According to the Pakistani court, public religious expression by 
Ahmadis was offensive to Pakistan’s other Muslim citizens and could 
lead the offended citizens to engage in violence.114 The court 
reasoned that since Ahmadi practices can elicit such violent reactions, 
the Pakistani government had the power to restrict the practices.115 
The majority opinion, written by Abdul Qadeer Chaudhry, based its 
decision primarily on concerns about public order and drew heavily 
 
 108. Id. at 342 (quoting Punjab Religious Book Society v. State, (1960) 12 PLD 
(Lahore) 629, 637–38 (Pak.)). 
 109. Id. (quoting Punjab Religious Book Society v. State, (1960) 12 PLD (Lahore) 629, 
638 (Pak.)). 
 110. Id. at 343. 
 111. Id. at 337. 
 112. Id. at 374–75. 
 113. Zaheeruddin v. State, (1993) 26 SCMR 1718 (Pak.). 
 114. Amjad Mahmood Khan, Misuse and Abuse of Legal Argument by Analogy in 
Transjudicial Communication: The Case of Zaheeruddin v. State, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & 
BUS. 497, 507–09 (2011). The court also spent a considerable portion of its opinion 
discussing the applicability of copyright and trademark law to religious terminology, agreeing 
that it does apply and does serve to prevent usage of these terms by non-Muslims. Id. at 509. 
 115. Id. at 509. 
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on U.S. case law.116 Among its citations were six U.S. Supreme Court 
cases:117 Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940);118 Jones v. Opelika (1942);119 
Reynolds v. United States (1879);120 Hamilton v. Board of Regents 
(1934);121 Cox v. New Hampshire (1941),122 and Lanzetta v. New 
Jersey (1939).123 Of these, Cantwell and Jones are the most relevant. 
The Cantwell citations generally invoked the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s warning that freedom of religion does not allow individuals 
to violate laws with impunity. The Pakistani court quoted the U.S. 
Supreme Court as saying, “the cloak of religion or religious belief 
does not protect anybody in committing fraud upon the public.”124  
The Zaheeruddin court also focused on the Cantwell Court’s 
acknowledgement that: 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Zaheeruddin, 26 SCMR 1718. 
 118. 310 U.S. 296. 
 119. 316 U.S. 584. 
 120. 98 U.S. 145. Reynolds, held, among other things, that a defendant could not violate 
a law prohibiting polygamy because he considered it his religious duty. Id. Zaheeruddin uses 
this case to support the proposition that, while laws cannot interfere with religious belief, they 
can legitimately interfere with religious practice. Zaheeruddin, 26 SCMR at 25. 
 121. 293 U.S. 245. In Hamilton, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the government 
does not violate religious freedom when it makes military training compulsory on a university 
campus, despite students’ religious objections, because such training is essential to the 
government duty to maintain peace and order. Id. at 256. But the law in question applied 
equally to all university students of a certain age and did not explicitly target adherents of a 
particular set of religious beliefs. In fact, the Supreme Court in Hamilton underscores its belief 
in robust religious liberties: “Undoubtedly [religious liberty] does include the right to 
entertain the beliefs, to adhere to the principles, and to teach the doctrines on which these 
students base their objections to the order prescribing military training.” Id. at 262. 
 122. 312 U.S. 569. Cox involved the arrest of defendants Jehovah’s Witnesses for 
marching near city hall with religious literature and signs without a license. The defendants 
argued that the applicable statute, which prohibited a “parade or procession” on public streets 
without a license, was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment. The lower court held, and 
the Supreme Court affirmed, that it was a traditional exercise of state power to regulate 
parades and processions on public streets. The Court also held that the statute’s purpose was 
not to restrict religious or free speech. Id. at 573–74. 
 123. 306 U.S. 451. Lanzetta is a case about the difference between vagueness and 
overbreadth. Id. In a sad irony, however, Pakistan’s blasphemy law is often abused for its 
vagueness. See FREEDOM HOUSE, POLICING BELIEF: THE IMPACT OF BLASPHEMY LAWS ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS, 73–74 (2010) (“Pakistan’s blasphemy laws are routinely used to exact 
revenge, apply pressure in business or land disputes, and for other matters entirely unrelated 
to blasphemy.”). 
 124. Zaheeruddin, 26 SCMR 1718. In reality, the Court wrote, “Nothing we have said is 
intended even remotely to imply that, under the cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity, 
commit frauds upon the public.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940). 
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[c]onduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of 
society. The freedom to act must have appropriate definition to 
preserve the enforcement of that protection. . . . It is . . . clear that 
a state may by general and non-discriminatory legislation regulate 
the times, the places, and the manner of soliciting upon its streets, 
and of holding meetings thereon; and may in other respects 
safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the community, 
without unconstitutionally invading [upon religious] liberties[.]125 
Although Cantwell clearly cautioned against misuse of the public 
order argument to suppress a fundamental right, the Zaheeruddin 
court cited Cantwell even as it “wholly den[ied Ahmadis’] right to” 
religious expression.126 Even setting aside the fact that Cantwell was 
superseded in 1969 by Brandenburg v. Ohio,127 the Pakistani court 
failed to note that the decision actually upheld the Free Exercise 
claim at issue. In the course of reaching its holding in Cantwell, the 
U.S. Supreme Court wrote: 
When clear and present danger of riot, disorder . . . or other 
immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the 
power of the state to prevent or punish is obvious. Equally 
obvious is it that a state may not unduly suppress free 
communication of views, religious or other, under the guise of 
conserving desirable conditions.128 
A permissible law under Cantwell must therefore be tightly 
drawn to strike at a “clear and present danger of” an “immediate 
threat to public safety, peace, or order.”129 The Zaheeruddin court 
cited Cantwell to do precisely the reverse. By choosing the wrong 
standard and then misapplying it, the Pakistani court managed to 
reach the exact opposite result that a U.S. court would. Of course, 
this misapplication may have been intentional; the court’s reliance on 
U.S. law lent it legitimacy—even as the court contorted the very 
meaning of the law. 
The court also cited, third-hand, a Supreme Court case from 
1942. Via a decision of the Indian Supreme Court, which in turn 
quoted an Australian court decision, Justice Chaudhry wrote: 
 
 125. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304. 
 126. Id. (emphasis added). 
 127. 395 U.S. 444. 
 128. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308. 
 129. Id. 
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The Supreme Court said in Jones v. Opelika, . . . with reference to 
the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, freedom of 
press and freedom of religion: “They are not absolutes to be 
exercised independently of other cherished privileges, protected by 
the same organic instrument.” It was held that these privileges 
must be reconciled with the right of a State to employ the 
sovereign power to ensure orderly living “without which 
constitutional guarantees of civil liberties would be a mockery.”130 
This time the Pakistani court was not ignoring the holding of the 
U.S. case. But it did fail to explain that Jones v. Opelika was vacated 
the next year on the authority of Murdock v. Pennsylvania.131 In the 
interim, Justice Byrnes had retired and been replaced by Justice 
Rutledge. The new majority struck down solicitation restrictions on 
free speech grounds, writing, “It does not cover, and petitioners are 
not charged with, breaches of the peace. They are pursuing their 
solicitations peacefully and quietly. Petitioners, moreover, are not 
charged with or prosecuted for the use of language which is obscene, 
abusive, or which incites retaliation.”132 That language, of course, 
would not have supported the Pakistani restriction. 
C. Religious Speech vs. Other Speech 
The Zaheeruddin decision also illustrates the growing disconnect 
between the blasphemy laws in Pakistan as the courts are currently 
interpreting them, and the rest of the courts’ free speech 
jurisprudence. First, it is important to understand the relevant text of 
the Pakistani Constitution protecting both free speech and religious 
freedom. Article 19 guarantees freedom of speech: 
Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and 
expression, and there shall be freedom of the press, subject to any 
reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the glory 
of Islam or the integrity, security or defence [sic] of Pakistan or any 
part thereof, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, 
decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, 
commission of or incitement to an offence [sic].133 
 
 130. Zaheeruddin, 26 SCMR 1718 (quoting Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 
593 (1942)). 
 131. 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
 132. Id. at 116 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)). 
 133. PAKISTAN CONST., art. 19. 
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And Article 20 protects the freedom to profess religion: 
Subject to law, public order and morality, — (a) every citizen shall 
have the right to profess, practice and propagate his religion; and 
(b) every religious denomination and every sect thereof shall have 
the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious 
institutions.134 
In its non-religious speech cases, Pakistan has taken the general 
approach of its Article 19 case law by considering the intent of the 
speaker and the imminence of the threat to public order as essential 
elements of the analysis. For example, in the contempt of the court 
case of Syed Masroor Ahsan v. Ardeshir Cowasjee, the court noted that 
in the United States: 
[T]he vehemence of the language used is no longer alone the 
measure of power to punish for contempt, but the deciding factor 
is whether it constitutes imminent, not merely likely, threat to the 
administration of justice and that the danger must not be remote 
or even probable, it must immediately imperil.135 
Similarly, during the constitutional crisis and conflict between 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in 
1993, the Supreme Court became involved and held that the 
president could dissolve the National Assembly only if a 
constitutional breakdown had occurred. In assessing allegations of 
treason leveled against Prime Minister Sharif by President Ishaq 
Khan, Justice Saleem Akhtar had occasion to remark: 
The danger should “imminently threaten immediate interference 
with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law” requiring 
immediate step [sic] to ensure security of the country. . . . The 
concept of “clear and present danger” in [sic] USA was liberalised 
[sic] by making “imminence” as [sic] a basic test.  
. . . If such a speech makes allegation [sic] or defames anyone 
without any justification, but does not create lawlessness, disorder, 
 
 134. Id. art. 20 §§ a–b. 
 135. Syed Masroor Ahsan v. Ardeshir Cowasjee, (1998) 50 PLD (SC) 823 (Pak.) (citing 
Craig v. Harney 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947)). 
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or threat to security or disruption, it will hardly amount to 
subversion of the Constitution.136 
The contrast between the Pakistan Supreme Court’s uses of U.S. 
free speech jurisprudence in the case of Nawaz Sharif v. President of 
Pakistan and in the case of Zaheeruddin v. State could not be more 
striking. This is particularly curious given the two opinions were 
issued in the same year. While the court focused on the imminence 
and immediacy of the threat to the public order when assessing 
Nawaz Sharif ’s free speech rights, the court in Zaheeruddin not only 
neglected addressing the imminence of any threat to the public 
order, but it also completely failed to consider the Ahmadi’s free 
speech rights under Article 19.137 In this regard, it is clear that the 
court’s blasphemy law jurisprudence has been completely unmoored 
from the court’s free speech jurisprudence. Not only has the 
necessary prerequisite of intent been eliminated from the statutory 
offenses in Chapter 15, the requirement of demonstrating an 
imminent threat to the public order has been eliminated from the 
court’s analysis as well. 
As will be discussed further in Parts IV and V below, in the 
United States, laws limiting hateful speech require a showing that “a 
violent reaction and a resultant breach of the peace” is imminent, in 
order for the speech to be constitutionally restricted.138 The speech’s 
mere prejudicial effect or offensiveness is not sufficient to subject it 
to restriction.139 In contrast, Pakistan’s blasphemy laws in their 
current form do not require a connection between the offensive 
speech and an imminent breach of the peace. “Not only do these 
laws not require a nexus between intent and action, they also do not 
require a nexus between action and outcome.”140 
Moreover, even in those cases where Pakistani courts discuss 
whether the impugned speech is likely to provoke a breach of the 
peace, there is “not a single instance” where the freedom of speech 
guaranteed by Article 19 of the Pakistan Constitution is invoked, 
nor is there a discussion of whether it has a role to play in the 
 
 136. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan, (1993) 45 PLD 473 § 20 (Pak.) 
(quoting Saia v. N.Y., 334 U.S. 558 (1948)) (citing Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 
382 (1950)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 137. See Siddique & Hayat, supra note 8, at 375–76. 
 138. Id. at 373. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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analysis.141 On the rare occasion that the blasphemy laws are 
challenged on constitutional grounds, Pakistan has been quick and 
“categorical in rejecting such arguments.”142 In this respect, the 
Zaheeruddin opinion is a rare example of the court “conducting a 
cost-benefit analysis of the” fundamental rights and “freedoms 
enshrined [in] the Constitution [albeit Article 20’s protection of 
freedom of religion instead of Article 19’s protection of freedom of 
speech] vis-à-vis [the] public policy” concern with preventing a 
“breach of the peace.”143 
Generally speaking, since General Zia’s Islamization efforts, 
Pakistan’s blasphemy law jurisprudence and free speech 
jurisprudence have become completely disconnected. Principles, such 
as intent and imminence, that made general free speech restrictions 
unconstitutional under Article 19, have been completely ignored 
when determining the constitutionality of religious speech under 
Article 20.144 This is unusual, given the fact that prior to the 
enactment of the blasphemy laws in their current form, Pakistani 
courts looked at both the intent of the speaker and the imminence of 
the threat to public order when deciding whether religious speech 
violated Chapter 15 of the PPC—just as the court did in Punjab 
Religious Books Society.145 
As will be discussed more fully below in Part IV, Pakistan can 
benefit from the example of U.S. free speech jurisprudence. In many 
ways, the Supreme Court of Pakistan has been wrestling for some 
time with the incorporation of the U.S. standard into its Article 19 
case law. But what is ironic is that while the U.S. standard of intent 
and imminence of violence is being incorporated into Pakistan’s free 
speech jurisprudence, the requirements of intent and imminence are 
simultaneously being eliminated from Pakistan’s blasphemy law 
jurisprudence. This discrepancy suggests that Pakistan’s misuse of 
U.S. law in the blasphemy context may be intentional. 
 
 141. Id. at 374. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 375. 
 144. Id. at 375–76. 
 145. Id. at 341 (quoting Punjab Religious Book Society v. State, (1960) 12 PLD 
(Lahore) 629, 631 (Pak.)). 
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D. OIC Defamation of Religions Resolution and Resolution 16/18 
The debate over the “defamation of religions” at the UN 
provides another example of U.S. free speech laws’ influence in the 
international context—and Pakistan’s rejection of those principles as 
applied to religious speech. In 1999, Pakistan was at the forefront of 
an effort by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to pass 
a resolution in the U.N. Commission on Human Rights on the 
Defamation of Religions.146 Pakistan presented the draft resolution as 
a solution for rising intolerance toward Muslims in the West, which 
Pakistan likened to anti-Semitic violence in Europe prior to World 
War II.147 
Other delegates thought the Resolution was unbalanced and 
criticized its sole focus on Islam, arguing that adherents of other 
religions were also discriminated against and subject to intolerance 
and persecution. Pakistan’s delegate agreed to change the title and 
paragraph 3 of the Resolution to make it inclusive of all religions, 
while the text continued to reflect Pakistan’s concerns regarding 
the treatment of Islam specifically.148 In 1999 and 2000, the 
resolution was adopted without a vote after these changes and 
 
 146. Asma T. Uddin, The UN Defamation of Religions Resolution and Domestic 
Blasphemy Laws: Creating a Culture of Impunity, in FREE SPEECH AND CENSORSHIP AROUND 
THE GLOBE 495 (Peter Molnar ed., 2015). 
 147. See U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess., 61st mtg. at ¶¶ 1–9, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1999/SR.61 (Oct. 19, 1999). 
 148. U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess., 62d mtg. at ¶¶ 1–9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/SR.62 
(Nov. 17, 1999). 
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comments.149 From 1999 until 2005, the Commission adopted 
similar resolutions annually.150 
A well-known example of the “defamation of religion” claim 
came after the publication of twelve cartoons of the Prophet 
Mohammed in a Danish newspaper in 2005. The culture editor of 
the newspaper subsequently explained his decision: 
When I visit a mosque, I show my respect by taking off my shoes. I 
follow the customs, just as I do in a church, synagogue or other 
holy place. But if a believer demands that I, as a nonbeliever, 
observe his taboos in the public domain, he is not asking for my 
respect, but for my submission. And that is incompatible with a 
secular democracy.151 
The OIC, however, issued a press release in 2005 criticizing 
“the recent incident of desecration of the image of the Holy 
Prophet Mohamed” and “using the freedom of expression as a 
pretext to defame religions.”152 This incident illustrates the disparity 
between public order exceptions and the defamation of religions 
 
 149. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. on the Sixty-First Sess., 2005/3, at 21, Mar. 14–
Apr. 22, 2005, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/135, Supp. No. 3 (2005); Comm’n on Human 
Rights, Rep. on the Sixtieth Sess., 2004/6, at 28, Mar. 15–Apr. 23, 2004, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2004/127, Supp. No. 3 (Apr. 13, 2004); Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. on the 
Fifty-Ninth Sess., 2003/4, at 34, Mar. 17–Apr. 24, 2003, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/135, 
Supp. No. 3 (2003); Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. on the Fifty-Eighth Sess., 2002/9, at 
56, Mar. 18–Apr. 26, 2002, U.N. No. E/CN.4/2002/200, Supp. No. 3 (2002); Comm’n on 
Human Rights, Rep. on the Fifty-Seventh Sess., at 47, Mar. 19–Apr. 27, 2001, U.N. No. 
E/CN.4/2001/167, Part II (Apr. 27, 2001); Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2000/84, 
Defamation of Religions, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Res/2000/84, at 336 (Apr. 26, 
2000); Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. on the Fifty-Sixth Sess., 2000/84, Mar. 20–Apr. 28, 
2000, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/167, Supp. No. 3 (2000); Comm’n on Human Rights, Res. 
1999/82, Report on the 55th Sess., Mar. 22–Apr. 30, 1999, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/167, 
at 280 (Apr. 30, 1999); Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. on the Fifty-Fifth Sess., Mar. 22–
April 30, 1999, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/167, Supp. No. 3 (1999). 
 150. G.A. Res. 60/150, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/150 (Dec. 
16, 2005); G.A. Res. 61/164, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/164 (Dec. 
19, 2006); G.A. Res. 62/154, U.N. GAOR, 62d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/154 (Dec. 
18, 2007); G.A. Res 63/171, U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/171 (Dec. 
18, 2008). 
 151. Flemming Rose, Why I Published Those Cartoons, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 19, 2006), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/17/AR2006021702499_2.html. 
 152. Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century, 
Solidarity in Action, Final Communique of the Third Extraordinary Session of the Islamic 
Summit Conference, art. 2, ¶ 11(Dec. 7−8, 2005), http://www.oic-oci.org/ex-
summit/english/fc-exsumm-en.htm. 
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slogan, as well as the OIC’s application of “defamation of 
religions” only to Islam. 
The Defamation of Religions Resolution was long criticized as a 
cover for domestic blasphemy laws. Over the years, the resolution 
began to lose popularity among delegates.153 In early 2011, two 
prominent Pakistani politicians were killed for opposing Pakistan’s 
blasphemy laws.154 The murders focused attention on the 
problematic concept of “Defamation of Religions” and its 
association with domestic blasphemy laws. As a result, the United 
States and other states opposed to the defamation concept worked 
with the OIC on a new resolution that dropped the “defamation” 
term entirely and replaced it with “vilification.”155 
In March of 2011, delegates passed U.N. Human Rights 
Council Resolution 16/18, completely removing the defamation 
language and replacing the title with, “Combating intolerance, 
negative stereotyping and stigmatization of, and discrimination, 
incitement to violence and violence against, persons based on 
religion or belief.”156 Operative Clause 2 states that the Human 
Rights Council: 
[e]xpresses its concern that incidents of religious intolerance, 
discrimination and related violence, as well as of negative 
stereotyping of individuals on the basis of religion or belief, 
continue to rise around the world, and condemns, in this context, 
any advocacy of religious hatred against individuals that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, and urges States 
to take effective measures, as set forth in the present resolution, 
consistent with their obligations under international human rights 
law, to address and combat such incidents.157 
 
 153. Uddin, supra note 146. 
 154. Jane Perlez, Extremists Are Suspected in Killing of Pakistani Minister, INT’L N.Y. TIMES (MAR. 2, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/world/asia/03pakistan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 155. Uddin, supra note 146, at 501–02. 
 156. Human Rights Council Res. 16/18, Res. adopted by the Human Rights Council: 
Combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and stigmatization of, and discrimination, 
incitement to violence and violence against, persons based on religion or belief, 16th Sess., 
Feb. 28–Mar. 11, 2011, U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., A/HRC/RES/16/18 (March 24,  2011). 
 157. Id. 
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Operative Clause 5(f) further calls for governments to “[a]dopt[] 
measures to criminalize incitement to imminent violence based on 
religion or belief.”158 
Those words echo the U.S. standard as announced in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio.159 The State Department has praised the 
resolution on multiple occasions, no doubt because the formal 
language matches the Supreme Court’s standard so neatly.160 The 
OIC’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Ufuk 
Gokcen, actually wrote in a 2012 op-ed: 
We moved away from the anti-defamation language of the previous 
OIC sponsored resolutions to a clearer acceptance of freedom of 
expression and focused on upholding the rights of the individuals 
against discrimination in an effort to foster international 
cooperation. Using much of the United States First Amendment 
language, Resolution 16/18 promotes respect for and protection 
of the individual rights of all people.161 
Both the OIC and the State Department thus see 16/18 as more 
consistent with U.S. standards than the old “Defamation of 
Religions” resolution. 
Despite widespread agreement on Resolution 16/18, Pakistan 
continues to maintain that its original resolution on defamation of 
religions is still necessary and valid. In introducing Resolution 
16/18, Pakistan’s OIC ambassador said, “I want to state 
categorically that this resolution does not replace the OIC’s earlier 
resolutions on combatting defamation of religions which were 
adopted by the Human Rights Council and continue to remain 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 160. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Joint Statement on Combating 
Intolerance, Discrimination, and Violence Based on Religion or Belief (July 15, 2011) 
[hereinafter Joint Statement], available at http://www.state.gov/r/ 
pa/prs/ps/2011/07/168653.htm; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Esther Brimmer, 
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Int’l Org. Affairs, Remarks on U.S. Priorities at Opening of UN 
Human Rights Council 22 (Feb. 26, 2013), available at 
http://www.state.gov/p/io/rm/2013/205203.htm. 
 161. Ufuk Gokcen, The Reality of Freedom of Expression in the Muslim World, THE HILL 
CONG. BLOG (Oct. 19, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-
policy/262855-the-reality-of-freedom-of-expression-in-the-muslim-world; see also Joint 
Statement, supra note 160. 
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valid.”162 He later told a reporter that all sides made concessions, but 
the OIC would never compromise on “anything against the 
Quran, . . . the Prophet, and . . . the Muslim community in terms of 
discrimination.”163 Other OIC representatives offered similar 
statements confirming Pakistan’s view of the Resolution and refuting 
the permanent representative’s position.164 
This dispute over interpretation may have been due to the 
vagueness of 16/18’s language. Partly to deal with this problem, 
the U.N. Special Rapporteur of the Right to Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression, other experts, and national representatives 
developed the Rabat Plan of Action in 2012.165 The Rabat Plan is a 
series of recommendations about the implementation of the 
international prohibition on incitement to hatred.166 Among other 
things, it recommended that states repeal blasphemy laws.167 It also 
urged courts to consider the context, speaker, intent, content, and 
extent of speech, as well as the “likelihood, including imminence” 
of violence.168 
Yet, while the UN reported that Pakistan’s OIC Representative 
said in early 2014 that “[t]he Rabat Plan of Action was useful in 
 
 162. Robert C. Blitt, Defamation of Religion: Rumors of Its Death Are Greatly 
Exaggerated, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 347, 362–63 (2011) (citing Zamir Akram, Permanent 
Representative of Pak. to the U.N. Office at Geneva, Remarks at the 16th Session, 46th Plenary 
Meeting of the Human Rights Council (Mar. 24, 2011) (emphasis added), available at 
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/sixteenth/hrc110324pm2-
eng.rm? start=00:39:20&end=00:49:44). 
 163. Maha Akeel, A Roadmap for Implementing UNHRC Resolution on Combating 
Religious Intolerance, OIC J., June–Aug. 2011, at 4, 5, available at http://www.oic-
oci.org/oicv2/journal/?lan=en. He went on to say that Islamic countries have a religious duty 
to protect religious minorities, even though he felt that none of them are “deliberately 
discriminating against [these] minorities.” Id. He added that most countries “have strong laws 
against religious discrimination,” but need to implement them. Id. He finished by saying, “At 
the same time we are asking for protection of Muslims living in the West, we must also be 
prepared to give the same treatment of minorities living in Muslim countries.” Id. 
 164. Blitt, supra note 162 at 362–64. This paper also highlights statements from the 
United States and other nations that ignore the statements of the OIC member nations. Id. 
 165. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Between Free Speech and Hate 
Speech: The Rabat Plan of Action, a Practical Tool to Combat Incitement to Hatred (February 21, 2013), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/TheRabatPlanofAction.aspx. 
 166. Id. 
 167. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rabat Plan of Action on the 
Prohibition of Advocacy of National, Racial, or Religious Hatred that Constitutes Incitement to 
Discrimination, Hostility or Violence (October 5, 2012), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ 
Issues/Opinion/SeminarRabat/Rabat_draft_outcome.pdf. 
 168. Id. at 6. 
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balancing freedom of expression and incitement to hatred or 
violence,”169 Pakistan has not embraced the approach in recent 
blasphemy cases. Even as it has paid lip service to Rabat Plan 
principles—and even as it has applied the principles in non-religious 
speech cases—Pakistan is careful not to let these discussions affect its 
ability to keep and enforce its blasphemy laws. Thus, Pakistan 
continues to resist the international consensus. 
In sum, Pakistan has insisted on treating religious speech 
differently than other speech; in particular, Pakistan, concerned 
about the public order ramifications of controversial religious speech, 
has failed to apply principles such as intent and imminence in its 
post-General Zia blasphemy law cases. This treatment of religious 
speech has led to widespread human rights abuses. 
One way to address Pakistan’s selective treatment of religious 
speech is to delve deeper into the U.S. law Pakistan purports to rely 
on and look to it for guidance. This Paper accomplishes this by 
looking at the reasons the United States shifted its approach to 
controversial speech. It will then demonstrate the relevance of the 
U.S. trajectory to Pakistan. Finally, it will discuss implementation of 
the U.S. standard in the Pakistani context. 
III. THE MIS-RECEPTION OF THE U.S. STANDARD 
The current American test for restricting speech on the grounds 
of public order was announced in Brandenburg v. Ohio.170 In a per 
curiam opinion, the Court wrote, “[T]he constitutional guarantees 
of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or 
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except 
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”171 The 
Court continued by holding that “the mere abstract teaching . . . of 
the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and 
violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and 
steeling it to such action.”172 There are thus three components: 
 
 169. U.N. Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Council 
Starts Dialogue with Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Religion and on Human Rights and Counter-
Terrorism (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx? 
NewsID=14352&LangID=E. 
 170. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 171. Id. at 447. 
 172. Id. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961)). 
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incitement (as opposed to “mere advocacy”),173 intent to incite,174 
and objective likelihood that violence is imminent.175 
Before looking closer at these factors, it is important to 
distinguish between incitement and “fighting words.” Whereas 
incitement is intended to rouse the listener to violence against a third 
party, fighting words are intended to insult the listener. As the U.S. 
Supreme Court explained in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the 
leading case on fighting words: 
[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute 
at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech . . . . These include 
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting 
or “fighting” words—those which by their very utterance inflict 
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been 
well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to 
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. “Resort to 
epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense 
communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the 
Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no 
question under that instrument.”176 
Chaplinsky held that “the appellations ‘damned racketeer’ and 
‘damned Fascist’ are epithets likely to provoke the average person to 
retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.”177 Importantly, 
American courts consider insults to a listener to be different from 
incitement to violently strike at a third party, with Chaplinsky 
governing the former and Brandenburg governing the latter. In 
many ways, this is the most important distinction between U.S. 
incitement law and the Pakistani laws: incitement requires a third-
party reaction, not simply what Professor Robert C. Post has called 
“provocation” that makes a speaker’s audience “so outraged that it 
 
 173. Id. at 449. 
 174. Id. at 447. 
 175. Id. 
 176. 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 
309, 310 (1940)) (emphasis added). 
 177. Id. at 574. 
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[feels] compelled to riot and commit mayhem.”178 In many (though 
not all) cases, when judges and officials in these countries talk about 
“public order,” they really ought to be using the different concept of 
“fighting words.” 
Of course, this raises the question: if “fighting words” is an 
unprotected category of speech, and if blasphemous statements are 
considered “fighting words” in different cultural contexts, would 
blasphemy laws be justified under U.S. free speech law? The answer 
is no—for several reasons. 
From a legal perspective, while fighting words is a category of 
speech not protected by the First Amendment, every time the U.S. 
Supreme Court has opined on a case involving fighting words, it has 
reversed the conviction, even if it has not overruled Chaplinsky.179 
The Court has used three different avenues to overturn the 
convictions and narrow the fighting-words doctrine.180 The first way 
is by ruling that the doctrine only applies to speech that is directed 
to another person and is likely to produce a violent response.181 The 
second way, which the Court uses more frequently, is by ruling that 
the laws prohibiting fighting words are either unconstitutionally 
overbroad or vague.182 Third, the Court has made clear that laws that 
prohibit only some fighting words, for example hateful speech that is 
based on race or gender, are content-based restrictions, which are 
also impermissible.183 
For example, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, a Minnesota local 
ordinance in St. Paul prohibited placing symbols, objects, or 
graffiti, including a burning cross or Nazi swastika on any public or 
private property which would arouse anger on the basis of race, 
color, creed, religion, or gender.184 The Supreme Court held this 
ordinance unconstitutional because it was content-based, that is, it 
prohibited only those fighting words that were based on race, 
 
 178. Robert C. Post, Free Speech in the Age of YouTube, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 2012), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/17/free-speech-in-the-age-of-youtube/. 
 179. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1002 
(3d ed. 2006). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 1005. 
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color, creed, religion or gender.185 By so holding, the Court made it 
very unlikely that a law banning fighting words would ever be 
upheld. If the law is narrow, the Court will most likely hold that it 
is unconstitutionally content-based, and if it is broad, then it will 
be held overbroad and vague.186 
These restrictions help explain why blasphemy should not be 
treated akin to fighting words. Blasphemy laws are inherently vague 
and overbroad—even broader than the broadest set of fighting 
words.187 Blasphemy is also inherently subjective, often depending on 
individual proclivities: How is one supposed to know whether, for 
example, a Christian preacher teaching beliefs variant from the 
dominant religion will enrage people, especially those outside of his 
congregation—that is, members of an unintended audience? Basic 
principles of statutory construction hold that a law is overly vague if 
a reasonable person cannot tell whether the law prohibits his or her 
actions or not.188 Blasphemy laws would clearly fall under this 
category. Blasphemy laws also constitute content-based prohibitions, 
as they prohibit only religion-based claims, and moreover, privilege 
some religious claims over others. 
Turning back to the Brandenburg standard, the Supreme Court 
reads “imminence” narrowly. Four years after Brandenburg, the 
Supreme Court explained in Hess v. Indiana what did not amount to 
an imminent threat.189 Gregory Hess had been convicted of 
disorderly conduct for saying either “We’ll take the fucking street 
later” or “We’ll take the fucking street again” at an anti-war 
demonstration.190 The Supreme Court concluded: 
[S]ince there was no evidence, or rational inference from the 
import of the language, that his words were intended to produce, 
and likely to produce, imminent disorder, those words could not 
be punished by the State on the ground that they had “a ‘tendency 
to lead to violence.’”191 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 1002. 
 187. See LEONARD W. LEVY, BLASPHEMY: VERBAL OFFENSE AGAINST THE SACRED, 
FROM MOSES TO SALMAN RUSHDIE 523 (1993). 
 188. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 179, at 941. 
 189. 414 U.S. 105 (1973). 
 190. Id. at 107. 
 191. Id. at 108–09 (quoting Hess v. State, 297 N.E.2d 413, 415 (Ind. 1973)). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court therefore requires violence to be 
within a very limited timeframe. To return to the example of the 
Danish cartoons of Mohammed, violent protests several months after 
the publication date would not count as “imminent.”192 
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that the American 
conception of “public order” is a narrower concept than the 
international idea of “l’ordre public,” borrowed from the French. As 
a result, the definition of the American public order exception itself 
is narrower than the French and international one: 
[T]he English expression “public order” [is] not equivalent to––
and indeed [is] substantially different from––the French expression 
l’ordre public (or the Spanish expression orden público). In civil law 
countries l’ordre public is a legal concept used principally as a basis 
for negating or restricting private agreements, the exercise of police 
power or the application of foreign law. In common law countries 
the expression “public order” is ordinarily used to mean the 
absence of public disorder. The common law counterpart of l’ordre 
public is “public policy” rather than “public order”.193 
Accordingly, an imminent threat to l’ordre public may not be 
recognized as an imminent threat under the U.S. courts’ public 
order exception.  
An explication of this sort by policymakers is possible, and may 
well have an impact, because it is the Pakistani courts that, in the 
first instance, relied on U.S. free speech law. If Pakistani courts had 
not looked to the United States for guidance, such a dialogue 
would likely be interpreted as cultural imposition. And despite 
fundamental cultural differences between the United States and 
Pakistan, Pakistan’s reliance on U.S. case law suggests room for 
common ground. 
 
 192. Of course, the cartoons also did not count as “incitement” because the violence 
resulted from insult felt by certain Muslims, not instructions to attack a third party. There was 
certainly incitement in that case, but it was on the part of irresponsible leaders who called on 
Muslims to carry out violence against the newspaper, the cartoonists, and other targets. 
 193. International Covenants on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 833 (IX), Annex, U.N. 
GAOR, 10th Sess., Agenda item 28, Part II, U.N. Doc. No. A/2929 ch. VI, art. 18, at ¶ 113 
(July 1, 1955). 
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IV. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
While the current U.S. doctrine should be a model for other 
countries, this was not always the case. There is no single 
explanation of why the United States rejected its earlier speech-
restrictive jurisprudence. But as modern liberalism and 
libertarianism came to prominence—with their skepticism of 
government, censorship, and commitment to democratic 
processes—the Court eventually moved from the restrictive “bad 
tendency” test to the Brandenburg standard. 
 
A. From Bad Tendency to “Clear and Present Danger” 
 
In eighteenth-century America, free speech protections were 
much closer to the state of affairs today in Pakistan. Blackstone 
believed that “blasphemous, immoral, treasonable, schismatical, 
seditious, or scandalous libel[ous]” speech could all be prohibited.194 
There was certainly some support for free speech. As one historian 
suggests, “[T]he actual practice of the American people reveals a 
society in which people certainly valued—and took for granted—the 
ability to read the news and opinion of others, as well as speak their 
minds on most subjects.”195 In some circles, the famous line from 
Cato’s Letters about free speech as “the great Bulwark of liberty” 
held sway.196 And when the Americans set about writing state 
constitutions during the Revolution, nine protected freedom of the 
press. But only Pennsylvania protected “freedom of speech” itself.197 
Furthermore, when political tensions worsened at the close of the 
eighteenth century, the federal government passed the now-infamous 
Sedition Act to punish certain speech.198 
 
 194. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151. 
 195. Stewart Jay, The First Amendment: The Creation of the Right to Free Expression: 
From the Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 773, 
784 (2008). 
 196. Id. at 785 (quoting JEFFERY A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM: 
THE IDEOLOGY OF EARLY AMERICAN JOURNALISM 25 (1988) (citing JOHN 
TRENCHARD & WILLIAM GORDON, CATO’S LETTERS: ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL AND 
RELIGIOUS 99 (1724))). 
 197. Id. at 787. 
 198. The Sedition Act of 1798, Fifth Congress; Enrolled Acts and Resolutions; available 
at http://constitution.org/rf/sedition_1798.htm. 
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Even after the repudiation of the Sedition Act, the speech-
restrictive “bad tendency” test remained dominant in the nineteenth 
century and the early twentieth century. The test allows the State to 
“retain[] the right to punish speech that tended, even remotely, to 
encourage violations of the law.”199 As stated by none other than 
Justice Holmes in 1907, the First Amendment did not prevent 
“punishment of such [speech] as may be deemed contrary to the 
public welfare.”200 But four cases in 1919 ultimately initiated a new 
era. The first three merely planted a seed of speech protection. In 
Schenck v. United States, Justice Holmes first used his now-famous 
phrase “clear and present danger.”201 In Frohwerk v. United States202 
and Debs v. United States,203 Holmes again wrote for the Court and 
cited Schenck. Of course, all four cases rejected the free speech 
challenge being brought before the Court. 
Only in the fourth case, Abrams v. United States, did Justice 
Holmes use his “clear and present danger” test to protect speech in 
his famous dissent, joined by Justice Brandeis.204 In particular, 
Holmes interpreted his phrase to require more immediacy and intent 
than the majority did.205 He wrote: 
I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that 
would justify punishing persuasion to murder, the United States 
constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended to 
produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about 
forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States 
constitutionally may seek to prevent.206  
He continued by reading the immediacy requirement strictly: “It is 
only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it 
about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of 
 
 199. Thomas L. Haskell, Redrawing the Boundaries of Permissible Speech, 77 TEX. L. 
REV. 807, 809 (1999) (quoting DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN 
YEARS 175 (1997)). 
 200. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). 
 201. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 202. 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919). 
 203. 249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919). 
 204. 250 U.S. 616, 624–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 205. Id. at 627–28. 
 206. Id. at 627. 
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opinion where private rights are not concerned.”207 Later in the 
dissent, he also stressed the necessity of intent.208 Although the 
Abrams dissent was not as strict as Brandenburg, Justice Holmes had 
begun the process of requiring both immediacy and intent. 
Among legal scholars, there is something of a pastime in 
explaining Justice Holmes’s apparent switch in 1919. One common 
theory is that the facts in the first three cases were different from the 
facts in Abrams.209 The excesses of the Red Scare of 1919 and 1920, 
after the war’s end, may have further encouraged Justices Holmes 
and Brandeis to dissent.210 Another common explanation is that 
Holmes and Brandeis fell under the influence of libertarian 
academics, especially Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr.211 
What is most important for the purposes of today’s 
jurisprudence, however, is the new theory of the First Amendment 
espoused in these dissents. Justices Holmes and Brandeis were 
skeptical of government’s ability to censor harmful ideas short of 
those that imminently threaten evil.212 Instead, they proposed a kind 
of marketplace of ideas, in which correct ideas would ultimately 
triumph. Holmes wrote in Abrams: 
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, 
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very 
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition 
of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their 
 
 207. Id. at 628. 
 208. Id. (citing Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905)). 
 209. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 619–20; David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First 
Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1312 (1983). 
 210. See Jay, supra note 195, at 845 (noting that Abrams was handed down just three 
days after the first Palmer Raid). 
 211. Rabban, supra note 209, at 1303, 1345; see also Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 
466, 486 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (referencing the work of Professor Chafee). 
 212. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“While that experiment is 
part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the 
expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so 
imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law 
that an immediate check is required to save the country.”) (emphasis added). 
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wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of 
our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.213 
Based on that theory, Justice Holmes phrased his standard 
as follows:  
I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to 
check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be 
fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate 
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that 
an immediate check is required to save the country.214 
The decisions in the Brandenburg era would later enshrine the same 
theory of free debate eventually leading to truth.215 
There was also an emerging majoritarian democratic argument in 
the Holmes-Brandeis dissents. As Justice Holmes wrote in Gitlow v. 
New York (1925), “[i]f in the long run the beliefs expressed in 
proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant 
forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they 
should be given their chance and have their way.”216 In Whitney v. 
California (1927), Justice Brandeis’s concurrence specifically made 
democracy about deliberation. He wrote, “[t]hose who won our 
independence believed that the final end of the State was to make 
men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the 
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.”217 Brandeis 
quoted Jefferson218 and attributed to the Founders collectively a 
belief that “[i]f there be time to expose through discussion the 
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of 
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced 
 
 213. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 338 
(1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“In frank expression of conflicting opinion lies the greatest 
promise of wisdom in governmental action; and in suppression lies ordinarily the greatest 
peril.”); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 273 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The 
fundamental right of free men to strive for better conditions through new legislation and new 
institutions will not be preserved, if efforts to secure it by argument to fellow citizens may be 
construed as criminal incitement to disobey the existing law—merely, because the argument 
presented seems to those exercising judicial power to be unfair in its portrayal of existing evils, 
mistaken in its assumptions, unsound in reasoning or intemperate in language.”). 
 214. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 215. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 216. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 217. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 218. Id. at 375 n.2. 
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silence. Only an emergency can justify repression.”219 For democratic 
reasons as well as a deep-seated skepticism, Holmes and Brandeis 
argued for more free speech. 
B. Doctrinal Upheaval 
Gradually, without settling on a single test, the Supreme Court 
began upholding First Amendment challenges in the late 1920s and 
1930s. In Fiske v. Kansas, a unanimous Court overturned a 
conviction under the Kansas Syndicalism Act for lack of evidence.220 
In Stromberg v. California, the Court noted that the right to free 
speech was included in the due process protection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and overturned a conviction for displaying a red flag.221 
As Chief Justice Hughes wrote for the majority, “[t]he maintenance 
of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that 
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that 
changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential 
to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our 
constitutional system.”222 The Court was slowly embracing not only 
the Holmes-Brandeis position but also its justification. 
The Court decisively protected speech in 1937. In De Jonge 
v. Oregon, it reversed a conviction on First Amendment 
grounds because the statute prohibited speech that did not 
necessarily constitute a threat to the government.223 Chief 
Justice Hughes explained, 
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from 
incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and 
violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the 
constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in 
order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to 
the end that government may be responsive to the will of the 
people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful 
means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very 
foundation of constitutional government.224 
 
 219. Id. at 377. 
 220. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). 
 221. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931). 
 222. Id. at 369. 
 223. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). 
 224. Id. at 365. 
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But as Professor David Rabban notes, “the first Supreme Court 
decisions in which the majority actually protected speech never 
mentioned [clear and present danger].”225 
Clear and present danger did return later in 1937, in a case 
upholding a First Amendment challenge. That case, Herndon v. 
Lowry, turned on the “present danger” requirement.226 In Thornhill 
v. Alabama, eight members of the Court signed an opinion 
rewording the test in a Holmesian manner to allow speech 
restrictions “only where the clear danger of substantive evils arises 
under circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits of 
ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of public 
opinion.”227 The Court explained: 
The safeguarding of these rights to the ends that men may speak as 
they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods may be 
exposed through the processes of education and discussion is 
essential to free government. Those who won our independence 
had confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning and 
communication of ideas to discover and spread political and 
economic truth. Noxious doctrines in those fields may be refuted 
and their evil averted by the courageous exercise of the right of free 
discussion. Abridgment of freedom of speech and of the press, 
however, impairs those opportunities for public education that are 
essential to effective exercise of the power of correcting error 
through the processes of popular government.228 
Justices Brandeis and Holmes had won, for now. 
But speech restrictions were not entirely out of favor. Justice 
Jackson dissented in Terminiello v. Chicago, voting to uphold a 
speech restriction only six years after West Virginia v. Barnette,229 
which held that students could not be forced to salute the 
American flag or recite the Pledge of Allegiance in school.230 
Jackson’s opinion in Barnette offered a powerful defense of free 
 
 225. Rabban, supra note 209, at 1346. 
 226. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 261 (1937). 
 227. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104–05 (1940). 
 228. Id. at 95 (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 
n.4 (1938)). 
 229. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
 230. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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speech, stating that constitutional rights are “beyond the reach of 
majorities and officials.”231 
Terminiello involved a public speech criticizing various political 
and racial groups as “inimical to the nation’s welfare.”232 In his 
dissent, Jackson argued that the majority, in protecting the speech, 
was overlooking a real threat to public order. Jackson examined in 
detail portions of Terminiello’s speech and his testimony at trial to 
demonstrate the tumultuous context of Terminiello’s speech. He 
even invoked the clear and present danger standard.233 Near the end 
of the opinion, Jackson famously warned, “if the Court does not 
temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will 
convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”234 
In 1951, a majority (with Justice Jackson in it) swung back 
towards restricting speech. The Court in Feiner v. New York upheld 
the conviction of a street corner speaker by a six-to-three vote.235 The 
speaker in that case “gave the impression that he was endeavoring to 
arouse the Negro people against the whites, urging that they rise up 
in arms and fight for equal rights.”236 His speech caused some 
disturbance in a mixed-race crowd, and the police arrested him when 
he refused to stop speaking.237 That same year, in Dennis v. United 
States, a fractured court turned back a First Amendment challenge in 
a national security case without a majority opinion.238 
Of course, as one might expect by this point in the story, the 
pendulum was not done swinging. Six years later, Justice Harlan 
ostensibly clarified the meaning of Dennis in Yates v. United States, 
writing, “The essential distinction is that those to whom the 
advocacy is addressed must be urged to do something, now or in the 
future, rather than merely to believe in something.”239 Justice Harlan 
cited Schenck and concluded that there was insufficient evidence to 
 
 231. Id. at 638. 
 232. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 3. 
 233. Id. at 26 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 
52 (1919)). 
 234. Id. at 37 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 235. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). 
 236. Id. at 317. 
 237. Id. at 317–18. 
 238. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
 239. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 324–25 (1957). 
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prove the imminence of the threat or “specific intent.”240 Entering 
the 1960s, then, the clear and present danger standard was alive but 
of uncertain meaning. 
C. Brandenburg, Cohen, and Free Speech Today 
The Court announced its current test, incitement to imminent 
violence, in Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1969. The rise of a “modernist 
consciousness”241 and its belief in deliberative democracy, coupled 
with the emergence of political libertarianism, produced the hands-
off approach to speech that reigns today. 
Professor G. Edward White has identified the so-called 
modernist consciousness in twentieth-century free speech doctrine. 
He specifically lists “the value of scientific knowledge, the 
importance of rationality, and the significance of the democratic 
process in furthering individual freedom of thought.”242 White’s 
discussion of the Court’s 1970s cases notes: 
Rather than assuming, as earlier courts had, that the messages in 
Cohen [v. California] and Collin [v. Smith (7th Cir. 1978)] were so 
patently juvenile or unsound that they played “no essential part in 
any exposition of ideas,” courts in the 1970s assumed that such 
messages might be sought to be suppressed because they were 
“inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.”243  
This commitment to protecting even lowbrow speech is the final 
leg on which modern American free speech jurisprudence stands, 
along with skepticism and democratic theory. To quote Justice 
Harlan in Cohen, “[i]ndeed, we think it is largely because 
governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this 
area [of speech] that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and 
style so largely to the individual.”244 This refusal to make distinctions, 
or even try to make principled ones, explains in large part the 
modern public order exception. That exception is narrow because 
the Court is committed to respecting all speech, no matter how 
 
 240. Id. at 318, 330–31. 
 241. G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech 
in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 301 (1996). 
 242. Id. at 304. 
 243. Id. at 365 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)). 
 244. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25. 
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hurtful, insulting, absurd, or offensive it may be, so long as it is not 
incitement to imminent violence. 
This relatively freewheeling approach to speech was a shared 
tenet of liberalism and libertarianism, both of which were well 
represented on the Court. The author of Cohen, Justice Harlan, was 
a libertarian. He was joined by three of the liberal lions (Justices 
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall) and a moderate (Justice 
Stewart).245 Brandenburg was a per curiam opinion. Justice Black, a 
libertarian, and Douglas concurred, while several liberals (Marshall 
and Chief Justice Warren) and another libertarian (Harlan) filed no 
separate opinion.246 Together with a commitment to deliberative 
democracy and truth through debate, this refusal to label speech as 
low-value and censor it underlies the current American case law. 
D. Lessons Learned 
This complicated history of American free speech jurisprudence 
offers several lessons for foreign countries. First, the process may not 
move quickly. Although the United States now has one of the freer 
speech regimes in the world, it did not settle on that law until 1969. 
Nor is it an irreversible course; the United States still struggles 
periodically with the temptation to expand its restrictions on speech. 
In 2012, Nakoula Basseley Nakoula produced a fourteen-minute 
film clip called the “Innocence of Muslims,” attacking the Prophet 
Mohammed. The film sparked outrage abroad, and several American 
public intellectuals have argued that the film may well fall outside the 
boundaries of protected speech.247 One of them, Sarah Chayes, 
 
 245. David J. Garrow, The Tragedy of William O. Douglas, THE NATION (Mar. 27, 
2003), http://www.thenation.com/article/tragedy-william-o-douglas/; David J. Garrow, 
Justice William Brennan, a Liberal Lion Who Wouldn’t Hire Women, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 
17, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/15/ 
AR2010101502672.html; Thurgood Marshall Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM, 
http://www.biography.com/people/thurgood-marshall-9400241 (last visited Oct. 13, 2015); 
Al Kamen, Retired High Court Justice Potter Stewart Dies at 70, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 8, 
1985, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/retired-high-court-justice-potter-
stewart-dies-at-70/2011/12/03/gIQA9mhjPO_story.html. 
 246. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449–50 (1969) (Black, J., concurring); id. at 
450–58 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 247. See, e.g., Anthea Butler, Op-Ed, Opposing View: Why ‘Sam Bacile’ Deserves Arrest, 
USA TODAY (Sept. 13, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/story/2012-
09-12/Sam-Bacile-Anthea-Butler/57769732/1; Sarah Chayes, Op-Ed, Does ‘Innocence of 
Muslims’ Meet the Free-Speech Test?, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2012), 
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suggests that “imminence” should be loosened to cover a period as 
long as two weeks after the speech.248 “The White House [even] 
asked YouTube to review the video to see if it was in compliance 
with their terms of use.”249  
Second, courts will be most successful in protecting free speech 
rights when the political branches support them. The American 
experience between World War I and Brandenburg could be mapped 
on top of rising and falling tensions: World War I (speech-
restrictive), backlash against the Red Scare (Holmes and Brandeis), 
the low-tension 1930s (speech-protective), another Red Scare 
(speech-restrictive), and then the aftermath of that experience 
(speech-protective). When political tensions about espionage ran 
high, the Court turned restrictive. When they abated, the Court 
eventually returned to protection. Although correlation does not 
imply causation, it is one of the only tools available to guess at the 
Supreme Court’s motivations.250 
American courts came to accept limits on government 
censorship of uncomfortable, hateful, or otherwise ill-meaning 
speech. Although foreign countries need not embrace the 
relativism of some U.S. decisions, it is important for them to 
understand that (for several crucial reasons discussed below) 
government cannot, and should not, censor speech for its violent 
tendencies unless it is incitement to imminent violence, “fighting 




 248. Chayes, supra note 247. 
 249. Byron Tau, White House Asked YouTube to ‘Review’ Anti-Muslim Film, POLITICO 
(Sept. 14, 2012, 1:20 PM), http://www.politico.com/politico44/2012/09/white-house-
asked-youtube-to-review-antimuslim-film-135586.html. The U.S. is not alone in struggling 
with the temptation to restrict speech. Section 5 of the United Kingdom’s Public Order Act 
prohibited “insulting words or behaviour” until a public outcry to expansive use of the 
language resulted in its repeal. See Robert Booth, “Insulting” to be Dropped from Section 5 of 
Public Order Act, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Jan. 14, 2013), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/14/insulting-section-5-public-order-act; 
James Chapman, Free Speech is “Strangled by Law that Bans Insults” and is Abused by Over-
Zealous Police and Prosecutors, DAILY MAIL (U.K.) (May 15, 2012), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2145009/Public-Order-Act-Free-speech-strangled-
law-bans-insults.html. 
 250. And, as Part V will explain, the ultimate solution to the problem of speech with 
violent tendency involves fundamental societal change. 
UDDIN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2016  9:17 PM 
727 Free Speech and Public Order Exceptions 
 773 
jurisprudence. As explained above, blasphemy does not fall into 
any of the categories of unprotected speech. 
V. WHY FREE SPEECH IS KEY TO STABILITY 
So far, this Paper has identified the ways in which foreign courts 
and politicians have used American cases to support blasphemy laws 
and contrasted the international standards with the U.S. version. But 
even in the discussion of how and why U.S. free speech law changed 
as it did, this Paper has not yet explained why American standards 
should be emulated. I offer two reasons. First, in the short term, the 
American doctrine actually prevents disorder. And second, in the 
long term, it prevents the infantilization of society and actually 
encourages the flourishing of religion. 
A. Overly Restrictive Speech Laws are Counterproductive 
The best way to prevent violence is to punish the violent actor, 
not the nonviolent speaker. Pakistan has upheld laws that prohibited 
nonviolent speech on religion, in the name of preserving public 
order. But violence is far more effectively controlled if states enforce 
laws that punish criminal behavior, such as laws against arson, 
murder, and other forms of intimidation and endangerment of 
religious persons. This sort of legal scheme also makes sense because 
it protects the fundamental human right to free religious expression. 
Individuals have the right to not only hold particular beliefs but also 
to express them in public—as long as they are peaceful and do not 
contravene the rights of others. This works in favor of the larger 
society rather than against it, as only in a free marketplace of ideas 
can those ideas with greater utility or persuasive power prevail.251  
Under the Pakistani blasphemy laws, the State de facto 
supports—in fact, incentivizes—incidents of violence, even though 
the purpose of the laws is to reduce violence motivated by religion. 
Blasphemy laws appease rather than control violent actors, giving 
them license to continue bullying religious minorities while the 
 
 251. Under U.S. law, when speakers are punished, such as in the case of incitement to 
imminent violence or fighting words, the speaker’s intentional state of mind is key: “[O]ne 
who intends to spur a criminal response on the part of his audience is arguably less deserving 
of protection . . . than one who recklessly creates that risk.” Marc Rohr, Grand Illusion? The 
Brandenburg Test and Speech that Encourages or Facilitates Criminal Acts, 38 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 1, 81 (2002). 
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police look the other way. They create a culture of impunity where 
increasingly egregious crimes are committed with little or no 
consequences for the criminals. 
Rather than punishing the speaker in order to prevent violence 
by others, the law should compel potentially violent people to 
control their own behavior—even in the face of insults. In American 
jurisprudence, this principle is called the “hostile audience” 
doctrine.252 The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “[a]s a general 
matter, we have indicated that in public debate our own citizens 
must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to 
provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the 
First Amendment.”253 In weighing the cost of imposing speech on 
unwilling listeners against the cost of preventing speech, the Court 
determined that the latter cost would be greater.254 
Empirical work confirms this idea. As Professor W. Cole 
Durham, Jr. testified to the Constitutional Court of Indonesia in the 
Indonesian Blasphemy Act challenge, “empirical studies analyzing 
these issues in virtually all the countries on earth demonstrate that 
government efforts to constrain religious freedom and coerce 
conformity are in fact the most significant factor leading to 
interreligious violence.”255 Durham also noted that “[t]he resulting 
conflicts are etched into collective memories of opposed groups, 
providing seemingly inexhaustible sources of hate, resentment and 
recrimination, sometimes extending across generations.”256 To stop 
this cycle of religious hatred, countries should enforce laws against 
 
 252. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951) (“We are well aware that the 
ordinary murmurings and objections of a hostile audience cannot be allowed to silence 
a speaker.”). 
 253. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 254. Id.; see also WOJCIECH SADURSKI, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ITS LIMITS 88 
(Francisco J. Laporta et al. eds., 1999). 
 255.  Judicial Review of Law Number 1/PNPS/1965 Concerning the Prevention of 
Religious Abuse and/or Defamation: Case No. 140/PUU-VII/2009 Before the Constitutional 
Court of Indonesia (2010) (testimony of W. Cole Durham, Jr., Director, International Center 
for Law and Religion Studies Brigham Young University), in INDONESIA: A RESOURCE GUIDE 
FROM THE LEGAL TRAINING INSTITUTE 58 (2012) (citing Brian J. Grim, Religious Freedom: 
Good for What Ails Us?, REV. FAITH & INT’L AFF., Summer 2008, at 3, 5 (2008); BRIAN J. 
GRIM & ROGER FINKE, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM DENIED: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND 
CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011)). 
 256. Durham, supra note 255, at 59. 
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violence and allow free expression on matters of religion, subject 
only to narrow exceptions like the public order justification.257 
In a study cited by Professor Durham above, sociologists Brian 
Grim and Roger Finke specifically found that “[g]overnment 
regulation is the strongest predictor of religious persecution even 
when controlling for other possible explanations.”258 In particular, 
they concluded that religious freedom leads to “a rich pluralism 
where no single religion can monopolize religious activity, and all 
religions can compete on a level playing field. Religious grievances 
against the state and other religions are reduced because all religions 
can compete for the allegiance of the people without the interference 
of the state.”259 Additionally, religious freedom “decreases the ability 
of any single religion to wield undue political power.”260 Less 
freedom of religion leads to more persecution, which in turn leads to 
less freedom of religion.261 On the other hand, as Grim has argued 
elsewhere, more freedom of religion leads to benefits for society, 
which in turn leads to more freedom of religion.262 
In fact, Justice Brandeis made a very similar argument in his 
Whitney concurrence. He wrote that the Founders 
knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of 
punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage 
thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that 
repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that 
the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed 
grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for 
evil counsels is good ones.263 
American free speech jurisprudence rests, among other things, 
on the empirically verified belief that stability should come 
 
 257. See Asma T. Uddin, The Indonesian Blasphemy Act: A Legal and Social Analysis, in 
PROFANE: SACRILEGIOUS EXPRESSION IN A MULTICULTURAL AGE 223 (Christopher S. 
Grenda et al. eds., 2014); Asma T. Uddin, Indonesian Blasphemy Act Restricts Free Religious 
Expression, HUFFINGTON POST (last updated May 25, 2011, 4:20 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/asma-uddin/the-indonesian-constituti_b_554463.html. 
 258. Brian J. Grim & Roger Finke, Religious Persecution in Cross-National Context: 
Clashing Civilizations or Regulated Religious Economies?, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 633, 654 (2007). 
 259. Id. at 636. 
 260. Id. at 637. 
 261. Id. at 652. 
 262. Grim, supra note 255, at 3–4. 
 263. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
UDDIN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2016  9:17 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
776 
through punishment of violent acts and not punishment of non-
violent speech. 
B. Restrictive Speech Laws Limit the Process of Rational Debate 
Individuals need to overcome their biases about other religions, 
instead of being told by the government how to think or feel. Doing 
otherwise only infantilizes members of a society. To begin with, 
government is not well suited to censoring ideas based on their 
content. By deviating from the state’s legitimate role in protecting 
each speaker’s right of expression, governments in states with 
blasphemy laws have made themselves the arbiter of which ideas 
warrant protection and which do not—an untenable proposition as 
spiritual truths do not lend themselves to empirical proofs.264  
Furthermore, anti-religious speech can be difficult to define, and 
restricting it can unduly hinder controversial truth claims.265 
Empowering the state to impose its subjective notions of “good” 
speech creates a cover for censoring all manners of dissent. The U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief has made a 
similar point: 
Although legislation that punishes defamation, including 
blasphemy, is designed to protect religion and addresses a 
legitimate concern, particularly with regard to phenomena such as 
fear of Islam and Christianity, it must be acknowledged that 
blasphemy or defamation are increasingly used by extremists to 
censure all legitimate critical debate within religions . . . or to bring 
to heel certain minorities accused of holding 
erroneous views . . . .266 
 
 264.  It was thus argued in a court case in Victoria, Australia, by Muslims attempting 
to enforce an ‘anti-vilification’ law very similar to ‘defamation of religion’ measures 
that ‘truth is not a defense’ when the defendant, a Pakistani-Christian pastor, 
attempted to read from the Qur’an during his court testimony to show that his 
statements regarding Islam were Qur’anic.  
BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, DEFAMATION OF RELIGIONS, SUBMISSION TO 
OSCE HUMAN DIMENSIONAL MEETING 2008 4 n.12 (2008), 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/34182?download=true. Local authorities have already used the 
‘anti-vilification’ law to prohibit the public reading of the Qur’an “because some Muslims 
deemed those passages to be defamatory of Islam.” Id. 
 265. Id. at 5. 
 266. Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Comm. on Freedom of Religion or Belief, 
Civil and Political Rights, Including Religious Intolerance, ¶ 187, Econ. & Soc. Council, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2001/63 (Feb. 13, 2001) (by Abdelfattah Amor). 
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For this reason, as well as out of recognition for the broader 
importance of free speech for societies, governments should endorse 
more protective speech laws.267 
C. Limited Debate Prevents True Religious Flourishing 
More centrally, re-assessment of a faith can help keep it 
vibrant and relevant to changing circumstances. Criminalizing 
blasphemy or “defamation of religions” stifles such exploration 
and is thus destructive to religious reform. It chills religious 
speech not just in the context of inter-religious dialogue, but also 
among members of the same faith who seek to explore and 
challenge their beliefs together with the laudable aim of spiritual 
and intellectual growth. Religion can hinder as well as help a 
society’s development. Deciding what the problematic aspects are, 
and how they should be fixed, is not the place of government, 
practically or in principle. Rather, governments should allow free 
speech and free exercise to ensure that religions remain vehicles 
for finding truth and personal fulfillment. 
CONCLUSION 
Since its inception in Enlightenment political philosophy, the 
notion of free speech has been inexorably tied to the idea of political 
dissent. The recognition of a need for strong public debate on issues 
that impact society implicates the need for a diversity of voices to 
formulate such debate. This in turn means that individuals must have 
liberty—liberty to give voice to ideas that may be unpopular or in 
direct opposition to the ideas of those in power. As the fledgling 
democracies of the world struggle to locate the appropriate 
intersection between safeguarding individual liberties and protecting 
collective sensitivities, it is important that they foster a vibrant and 
open marketplace of ideas (to accurately paraphrase Justice Holmes). 
U.S. law has erred on the side of liberty for over four decades now. 
 
 267. Sadly, there are many examples of radicals attempting to silence intellectual debate 
under cover of restricting religious speech. In Egypt, academic Nasr Abu Zayd was effectively 
banished from his homeland for academic writings about the nature of the Qur’an. In Kuwait, 
another professor was investigated for opposing the adoption of Sharia law. And in Lebanon, a 
composer was charged with blasphemy for singing a verse of the Qur’an Koran. Mona 
Eltahawy, Lives Torn Apart in Battle for the Soul of the Arab World, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.) 
(Oct. 19, 1999 9:09 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/oct/20/1. 
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For both U.S. foreign policy makers and those in Muslim-
majority countries seeking more liberal speech laws, the good 
news is that many countries look to the U.S. for guidance. The 
challenge is that many of them, like Pakistan, willfully or 
innocently misunderstand the nature of the U.S. standard. I 
therefore recommend that foreign courts, U.S. policymakers, and 
other stakeholders: 
 Continue drawing on U.S. free speech standards as a 
model and source of legitimacy for reform. 
 Clarify that “incitement to imminent violence” requires 
incitement of third parties, intent to incite, and a 
likelihood of imminent violence. 
 Build on the Rabat Plan by encouraging countries to 
move away from “defamation of religion” and towards 
the U.S. standard. 
 Encourage courts, politicians, and voters to reject the 
idea that government can, or should, censor unpopular 
or hateful speech short of the exceptions in U.S. law. 
 Promote religious freedom as a means of promoting stability. 
 Promote religious freedom as a means of fostering 
stronger religious belief and a stronger society. 
 
Following these ideas can lead to more liberal free speech laws in 
Pakistan and similar countries where citizens are suffering from deep 
injustices simply on account of their faith and religious views. 
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